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THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CASH TRANSFERS ON LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND SCHOOLING OF YOUNG ADULTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
I.1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades, social cash transfers have emerged in many developing countries as 
one of the main social protection instruments used by governments or non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) to reduce poverty and vulnerability (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; 
Department for International Development, 2011).  Usually, these transfers are non-contributory 
payments of cash made available to individuals or households by their government or NGOs.  
The transfers can be conditional or unconditional
1
.  Also, the transfers explicitly target 
individuals or groups of individuals, i.e. poor households, women, children or the elderly who 
are often considered to be the most vulnerable (Samson, 2009; Carmona, 2009; Woolard and 
Leibbrandt, 2010).  Over the last decade, researchers have increasingly focused on 
understanding the different channels through which social cash transfers help alleviate poverty 
and protect the most vulnerable (Department for International Development, 2011).  Three main 
themes have dominated this strand of research.  The first theme investigates the effects of social 
cash transfers on household investments in human capital, including children’s health and 
                                                             
1
  Conditional cash transfers require recipient households to use educational or health services for the 
benefit of children living in the household (e.g. Mexico’s Oportunidades require 85 percent children’s  
school attendance rates) (World Bank, 2009).  In contrast, unconditional cash transfers do not require 




educational outcomes (e.g. Duflo, 2003; Olinto, 2004; Samson et al., 2004; Adato and Bassett, 
2008; Paxson and Schady, 2008; Baird et al., 2010).  The second theme is interested in the role 
that social cash transfers play in mitigating the effects of negative income shocks on household 
consumption and decisions on investment in human capital (e.g. Subbarao, 2003; Dercon, 
2006).  Finally, a third theme focuses on how social cash transfers can promote gender equality 
(e.g. World Bank, 2008; Holmes and Jones, 2010).  I build on these previous researches and use 
the South Africa’s Old Age Pension (OAP) program to investigate the effects of social cash 
transfers on labor force participation and schooling of African young adults.   
South Africa’s OAP program was implemented in 1928 as a safety net for Whites and 
Colors who did not have private pension for retirement.  It was later extended to Africans and 
Asians in 1944 with limited and discriminatory entitlement standards and benefits (Sagner, 
1998).  As the apartheid era came to an end, there was pressure on the South African 
government for racial
2
 parity in pension eligibility and benefits (Bertrand, Mullaninathan, and 
Miller, 2003).  A law was enacted in 1996 to abolish any form of discriminatory practice 
towards pensioners from any racial group (Sagner, 2000; Seeking 2003; and Seeking and 
Nattrass, 2005).   
 Since OAP is means-tested on an individual’s income and assets, almost all Whites as 
well as richer Africans were excluded from this scheme, leaving majority of the African 
population to benefit the most (Case and Deaton, 1998).  Thus, the main goal of OAP since its 
reform has been to alleviate poverty and improve the living standard of elderly South Africans.  
As a result of its generous payout of 370, 470, 1080, and 1140 rand that is twice the median per 
capita monthly household income for Africans in 1993, 1998, 2010, and 2011 respectively (Case 
and Deaton, 1998; Duflo, 2003; Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2010; South Africa Social Security 
Agency, 2011/12), there have been extensive studies by researchers and policy makers to 
                                                             
2  The official racial categories in South Africa include: Africans (Blacks), Whites, Colored, and Asians 




understand the behavioral outcomes due to these large cash transfers.  These studies focused on 
poverty and resource allocation (Case and Deaton, 1998; Maitra and Ray, 2003a; and Jensen, 
2003); child welfare (Duflo, 2003 and Edmonds, 2006); labor force participation (Bertrand et al., 
2003; Lam, Leibbrant and Ranchhod, 2005; Posel et al., 2006; Ranchhod, 2006; Sienaert, 2008); 
and household composition (Sagner, 2000; Klasen and Woolard, 2000; Wittenberg and 
Collinson, 2005; Edmonds et al., 2005).   
 Despite the end of apartheid rule and the promise of a new political and economic 
prosperity and equality for all South Africans, many South Africans still live in poverty and 
unemployment is an important socio-economic issue facing the government.  Using the narrow 
and broad definitions of unemployment, 26% and 40% of the current labor force is unemployed, 
respectively (Banerjee et al., 2008).  This unemployment rate is particular high among Africans 
who have the largest unemployment rate among all racial groups.  In 1995, Africans accounted 
for 36.9% of the unemployment rate and it increased in 2003 to 48.8% (Kingdon and Knight, 
2007).  Also, young adults in South Africa are facing similar challenges of high unemployment 
in the labor market due to their lack of previous work experience, less educational attainment, 
and poor health status due to HIV/AIDS epidemic (Altman, 2007).  Young adults aged 18-24 
experienced 20% decline in employment from December 2008 to December 2010 and accounted 
for 30% of the overall unemployment in South Africa (National Treasury, 2011).  African young 
adults accounted for 89.8% of unemployment (aged 15-19, 20-24, and 25-34 experienced 8.1%, 
32.0%, and 49.7%, respectively) across all racial groups in South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 
2002).  
 Previous studies on the effect of OAP on African prime age adults labor force 
participation has produced mixed results (e.g. Bertrand et al., 2003; Posel et al., 2006).  Bertrand 
et al. (2003) using a representative rural household sample data in 1993 found that OAP reduced 
prime age adults aged 16-50 labor force participation especially for male living with female 




and redefining household to include non-residents found that OAP had no negative effect on 
prime age adults aged 16-50 labor force participation; rather, households with pension recipients 
had positive impact on job search especially among unemployed female household members.   
In term of human capital investment, Duflo (2003) found that female pensioners had a 
larger impact on the anthropometric status of girls than boys.  The puzzling finding of Duflo 
(2003) is that the effect of OAP is an all-female channel; that is, the effect channel emerged from 
the grandmothers to mothers to the granddaughters and there is no impact at all if the pensioners 
are male.  However, one possible explanation of this outcome is that females receive their 
pension earlier than males (females receive their pension at age 60, whereas males receive them 
at age 65) and females live longer (Duflo, 2003).  Edmonds (2006) investigating the impact of 
OAP on child labor and schooling decision found that OAP reduced child labor but increased 
their schooling attendance to nearly 100%, especially for rural boys who were living with an 
elder male pensioner.  Similar results were observed for elder females who are nearly eligible 
suggesting that males are at a greater credit constraint than are females.  Thus, OAP reduced 
cash constraints, which allowed poor families to invest in their children educations as well as 
allowing their children to work less.   
 This paper investigates the impact of OAP on labor force participation and schooling of 
African young adults in South Africa.  That is, to what extent does OAP impact labor force 
participation and school enrollment of African young adults?  Does the effect of OAP differ by 
gender of the pension recipients?  Does the effect of OAP differ by gender of the African young 
adults?”  Answers to these questions will shed light on the impact of OAP household recipients’ 
behavior and particularly how OAP affects labor force participation and schooling of African 
young adults.  The main contribution of this paper is to simultaneously investigate the labor 
force participation and schooling of African young adults aged 14-22 in post-apartheid South 
Africa as they move through school and enter into the labor market.  This paper differs 




school attendance outcomes for aged 5-17 (Edmonds, 2006), children anthropometric status aged 
0-5 (Duflo, 2003), and prime age adults labor force participation aged 16-50 (Bertrand et al., 
2003; Posel et al., 2006; Sienaert, 2008). 
Using Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) identification strategy, I find that any 
OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts did not have any significant impact on labor force 
participation and schooling of young adults (females and males) aged 14-20.  In contrast, 
OAPFemale receipts have significant and negative impact on labor force participation of young 
adult males aged 21-26.  Although, OAPFemale receipts have positive impact on school 
enrollment of young adult males aged 21-26, these estimates were not statistically significant.  
On the other hand, OAPMale receipts have positive and significant impact on labor force 
participation as well as negative and significant impact on school enrollment of young adult 
males aged 21-26. 
I.2 The South African Old-Age Pension Program 
South Africa’s non-contributory state pension was introduced and restricted in 1928 to Whites 
and Colors as a safety-net for those who did not have private pensions as they reached 
retirement.  This non-contributory state pension was extended to Africans and Asians in 1944 
with limited and discriminatory entitlement standards and benefits (Sagner, 1998).  
Discriminatory entitlement benefits were withdrawn from Africans who had income larger than 
700 rand compared to Whites 2250 rand, and Whites had 10 times the level of benefits as 
compared to Africans (Duflo, 2003).  Also, White pensioners received their pension through 
mail compared to Africans who had to be at a particular location in order to receive their pension 
and it was sometimes impossible for Africans to receive their pension if they lived in far rural 
areas of South Africa.  Moreover, the government manipulated Africans’ age data to exclude 
individuals from the computer; thus, reducing the number of eligible pensioners as well as the 




 OAP is funded through taxation and it is means-tested on an individual’s income and 
assets
3
.  The maximum benefit in 1993 was 370 rand per month and that increased in 1998 to 
470 rand per month (Case and Deaton, 1998).  In 2010 and 2011, OAP payout increased to 1080 
and 1140 rand per month (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2010; South Africa Social Security Agency, 
2011/12).
4
  This scheme mainly targets poor individuals and age is the primary instrument used 
to determine pension eligibility.  Hence, women over 60 years old and men over 65 years old are 
eligible for the pension
5
.  About 14 percent of White women and 7 percent of White man receive 
OAP.  By contrast, 80 percent of African women and 77 of African men reported receiving OAP 
(Case and Deaton, 1998).   
I.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used for this paper is the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS)
6
.  CAPS is a longitudinal 
study of the lives of a representative sample of young adults aged 14-22 that live in the Cape 
Town Metropolitan area of South Africa.  The aim of this longitudinal study was to document 
the transition from adolescents to adulthood in post-apartheid South Africa.  Particularly, the 
survey intended to track the adolescents as they move through school, enter into the labor 
market, move into their own households, and start their own families.   
                                                             
3
  Means-testing only depend on elderly income and assets and not on the income of other household 
members.  See Case and Deaton (1998) for more detail on how the means-test is implemented.  
 
4
  These incomes are about half the average African household income and twice the median per capita 
income among Africans. 
5  Although age is the primary instrument used to determine pension-eligible individuals, individuals who 
are closer to this eligibility criterion may increase their reported age to receive the pension benefits.  The 
system is not 100% perfect but there is little evidence of widespread cheating on age.   
 
6
  The Cape Area Panel Study Waves 1-2-3-4 were collected between 2002 and 2006 by the University of 
 Cape Town and the University of Michigan, with funding provided by the US National Institute for Child 





There were approximately 5,250 households and 4,752 young adults who were randomly 
selected and interviewed from 2002-2006.  In wave 1 (2002), all young adults and their 
household members as well as other households that did not have members between 14-22 years 
old were interviewed.  Wave 2a and 2b re-interviewed a third and two-thirds of the young adults 
in Cape Town Metropolitan area in 2003 and 2004, respectively.  In wave 3 (2005), the full 
young adults sample and approximately 2,000 co-resident parents of young adults were 
interviewed.  In wave 4 (2006), the full young adults sample and a sample of older adults and all 
children born to female young adults were also interviewed.  There were up to three young 
adults who were interviewed in every household. 
 The drawback of this panel survey as any other panel survey is attrition over time.  The 
overall response rates of young adults in wave 2, 3, and 4 were 83%, 74%, and 72%, 
respectively.  The attrition rate was the largest for the White young adults, followed by Africans 
and Colors.  Successful response rates in wave 4 for Whites, Africans, and Colors were 41.8%, 
74.2%, and 79.5%, respectively.  The main reason given for non-response in African households 
was moving within South Africa.  I used wave 1 (2002), wave 3 (2005), and wave 4 (2006) for 
my descriptive statistics and empirical analyses.  Also, I used inverse probability weighting 
(IPW) method to correct for potential biases from sample attrition (Wooldridge, 2001).  Table 1 
presents household and individual level descriptive statistics, by reported OAP status and 
gender-specific age eligibility.  Membership in a household was defined as living in the 
household for more than 15 days of the last 30 days.   
 In table 1, panel 1 shows that household size, children under 5 years old, children 6-15 
years old, and age of oldest household member are larger for pension recipient compared to non-
pension recipient households.  Female pensioners had larger household size and more children 6-
13 years old compared to male pensioners.  On the other hand, male pensioners were slightly 
older and had more children under 5 years old compared to female pensioners.  I observe from 




off age of 60.  This means that they are turning 60 or just close to turning 60.  There were 37 
females who reported not receiving OAP but who are eligible.  The same observation can be 
made for males older than 65 who reported not receiving OAP.  They are just on average around 
the cut off eligibility age of 65; thus, they may have just turned 65 or are close to turning 65.  
There were 26 males who reported not receiving OAP but who are eligible.  In total, there were 
61 individuals (females and males) who reported not receiving OAP but who are eligible and 
they constitute 1.72% of the data.  Also, 11 individuals reported receiving OAP even though 
they are not eligible and they constitute 1.97% of the data.  
 
Table 1, panel 2 shows young adults’ characteristics such as employment, age, school 
enrollment, and Matric completed (Grade 12).  Pension-recipient households have more 
employed young adults on average (26.2%) than non-pension-recipient households (24.5%).  
Young adults in pension-recipient households were slightly older but they were on average less 
Table 1: Household Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard Deviation)
OAP Receipt Recorded: No Yes
Age-Eligible Members: None Yes: Female(s) only Yes: Male(s) only Yes: Both None Yes: Female(s) only Yes: Male(s) only Yes: Both
Panel 1: Household Composition
Household size 6.068 7.730 6.923 7.397 6.091 8.154 7.041 7.961
(2.655) (3.421) (2.111) (2.960) (1.375) (3.598) (2.520) (3.459)
Children under 5 years old 0.646 0.622 0.654 0.635 0.273 0.831 0.938 0.849
(0.857) (0.758) (0.562) (0.679) (0.467) (1.054) (1.289) (1.098)
Children 6-15 years old 0.887 1.027 0.808 0.937 0.636 1.091 0.835 1.047
(0.984) (1.013) (0.939) (0.982) (0.809) (1.127) (1.038) (1.115)
Age of oldest household member 44.642 60.838 65.500 62.762 59.818 71.165 71.309 71.190
(10.271) (1.280) (0.50 (2.532) (1.779) (7.998) (5.593) (7.630)
Panel 2: Young Adults
Employed 0.245 0.228 0.423 0.311 0.333 0.264 0.250 0.262
(0.430) (0.426) (0.504) (0.467) (0.500) (0.441) (0.435) (0.439)
Age 19.875 19.270 21.346 20.127 20.727 19.859 20.402 19.953
(3.051) (3.517) (3.149) (3.499) (3.717) (3.184) (2.882) (3.138)
In school 0.608 0.621 0.533 0.591 1.000 0.626 0.554 0.613
(0.488) (0.494) (0.516) (0.497) (0.000) (0.485) (0.500) (0.488)
Matric completed 0.205 0.135 0.160 0.145 0.091 0.200 0.149 0.191
(0.403) (0.347) (0.374) (0.355) (0.302) (0.400) (0.358) (0.393)




likely to complete their Matric compared to young adults in non-pension recipient households.  
Also, more young adults in pension-recipient households were enrolled in school (61.3%) 
compared to young adults in non-pension-recipient households (60.8%).  In addition, more 
young adults living with female pensioners were more employed, had higher school enrollment 
status, and completed their Matric compared to young adults living with male pensioners.   
I.4 Empirical Model and Identification Strategy 
To evaluate the impact of OAP on labor force participation and schooling of young adults, I will 
ideally want to estimate the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression: 
                                                                                                              (1) 
In equation (1), i indicates individual young adult in household h.  The variable     is a dummy 
variable representing the outcome of interest (labor force participation and school enrollment), 
     is a dummy variable indicating whether a household member receives pension,     is a 
vector of young adult and household characteristics, and     is the error term.  However, the OLS 
estimates of equation (1) will be biased if there is a systematic difference between pension-
receiving and non-pension receiving households (e.g. pension-receiving households are older on 
average compared to non-pension receiving household) (Bertrand et al., 2003; Sienaert, 2008).  
To address this issue, OAP identification in the survey made it possible to employ RDD to 
estimate the causal effect of OAP on labor force participation and schooling of young adults.   
 RDD was first introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) and later implemented 
by economists in the early 1990s to estimate program effect in a wide variety of economic 
contexts (Lee and Lemieux, 2009).  The goal of this paper is to examine the causal effect of OAP 
on labor force participation and schooling of young adults.  This estimation is made possible by 
age-eligibility rule of OAP for women and men at 60 and 65 years old, respectively.  The causal 
effect is estimated as the discontinuity of labor force participation or schooling of young adults at 
the threshold of pension-eligibility age at 60 or 65 years old, respectively.  The idea is that in the 




participation or schooling of young adults in a continuous fashion and ascribing any jump away 
from the trend at age 60 or 65 to the pension.   
 Also, this approach relies on the idea that households around the cutoff points have 
similar characteristics except for the pension status.  RDD requires mild assumptions and its 
inferences are potentially more credible compared to other non-experimental approaches such as 
difference-in-differences or instrumental variables (Lee and Lemieux, 2009).  Moreover, Lee 
(2008) proved that there is no need to assume that isolated treatment variation is “as good as 
randomized” but randomized variation occurs because the agents are unable to precisely 
manipulate or control the assignment variable near the known cutoff point.  Thus, given the age-
eligibility rule for receiving OAP, evidence from descriptive statistics in table 1 of “age of oldest 
household member” and figures 1, 2, and 3 (see Appendix) confirm that I can exploit sharp RDD 
in the “treatment” (labor participation or school enrollment) as a function of “OAP receipts” or 
“age of oldest household member”.  Also, figures 4 and 5(see Appendix) confirm the effect of the 
outcomes (labor force participation or school enrollment) around the cutoff age of oldest 
household member.  Although these figures provide some confirmation regarding the nature of 
the data in term of assignment and treatment variables, they are not enough to establish any 
causal effect of OAP on labor force participation and school enrollment of young adults.  
To quantify this causal effect, I estimated sharp RDD as follow: 
                                               
       
                                             (2) 
In equation (2), i indicates individual young adult in household h.  The variable     is a dummy 
variable representing the outcome of interest (labor force participation and school enrollment), 
     is a dummy variable indicating whether a household member receives pension,    is age 
of oldest household member,   
  is age-squared of oldest household member,   
  is age-cubed 
of oldest household member,    is wave 1, 3, and 4 (2002, 2005, and 2006) respectively, and     




I.4.1 Internal Validity 
One of the underlying assumptions of RDD is that as a result of local random assignment “age-
eligibility rule of OAP” (women at 60 and men at 65years old), individuals should not be able to 
manipulate the assignment variable.  Although, I cannot test this directly, a graphical 
representation of the raw data using different baseline covariates as outcome variables against 
assignment variable “age-eligibility rule of OAP” can provide some validity to RDD that there is 
no discontinuity around the neighborhood of the cutoff point.  Figures 6 to 12 (see Appendix) 
validate this assumption using baseline covariates.  These covariates include household 
characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, Marital 
status of household member) and household assets (Household ownership of home, Life 
insurance, and Washing machine).   
 By construct, RDD does not need any covariates due to the assumption that around the 
cutoff points, households exhibit similar characteristics and as such assignment to treatment is 
independent of covariates and the estimate of the treatment effect is consistent (Lee and 
Lemieux, 2009).  To ensure that my results are not sensitive to the inclusion of covariates, I 
estimated the following sharp RDD equation: 
                                             
       
                                         (3) 
In equation (3), i indicates individual young adult in household h.  The variable     is a dummy 
variable representing the outcome of interest (labor force participation and school enrollment), 
     is a dummy variable indicating whether a household member receives pension,    is age 
of oldest household member,   
  is age-squared of oldest household member,   
  is age-cubed 
of oldest household member,     is a vector of young adult and household characteristics,    is 





I.4.2 Attrition: Test and Correction 
While the 2002 sample was drawn randomly from the household that had young adults aged 14-
22, attrition across waves as the survey progress is evidence.  The overall response rates of 
young adults in wave 2, 3, and 4 were 83%, 74%, and 72%, respectively.  The attrition rate was 
the largest for the White young adults, followed by Africans and Colors.  Successful response 
rates in wave 4 for Whites, Africans, and Colors were 41.8%, 74.2%, and 79.5%, respectively.  I 
only focus on African young adults and their households in this study.  The main reason given 
for non-response in African households was moving within South Africa.  
 Table 2 presents the summary statistics by attrition using 2002 data.  On average, stayers 
live in larger households, stay in households with more pension recipients, are less likely to 
complete Matric, are younger, show better attitude and behavior during the survey interview, and 
are in households with more young adult males.  Testing for differences between the two samples 
of stayers and leavers, the p-value is statistically significant at 1% for the following variables: 
OAP, household size, and young adults’ age.  It appears that young adults in my analysis sample; 
that is, stayers are not random sample from the original sample in 2002.  Therefore, I need to 
correct for any potential attrition bias that may underestimate or overestimate the effects of each 
factor on labor force participation or school enrollment of young adults.  I use inverse probability 
weighting (IPW) method to correct for potential biases from sample attrition (Wooldridge, 2001).  
This procedure only requires the data that I have and differ from the traditional Heckman solution 
which require an instrumental variable that will be observable for the entire sample.  The 
Heckman solution may not be feasible because it is difficult to find an instrumental variable that 





 There are two stages that are required in order to employ the IPW procedure.  In the first 
stage, at t (t=2005, 2006), an attrition probit model is estimated with young adults still in the 
sample at t-1
7
.  Given this sample, some young adults are lost to attrition at time t, and some are 
not.  Thus, the conditional probit model is estimated as follow: 
                                                                                                               (4) 
where     is the probability that young adult i stay in survey s at time t=2005, 2006 and the error 
term is normally distributed as                     .  However, since the sample may not be 
representative of the population in the original sample in t-1=2002, the IPW procedure cannot be 
used directly to mitigate the attrition bias associated with this sample.  Using the joint 
probabilities computed from these predicted conditional probabilities can provide consistent 
estimators when using IPW procedure (Wooldridge, 2002d).  In the second stage, these predicted 
                                                             
7  The IPW procedure notations closely follow Mu (2003). 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics in 2002 by Attrition: Mean (Standard Deviation)
Stayers Leavers (1)-(2)
Variables (1) (2) P-value
OAP 0.139 0.088 0.000
(0.346) (0.284)
Household size 5.969 5.095 0.000
(2.808) (2.656)
Young adults age 17.854 18.365 0.000
(2.515) (2.438)
Young adults gender 0.444 0.420 0.262
(0.497) (0.494)
Young adults completed Matric 0.103 0.124 0.125
(0.304) (0.330)
Attidude of respond 2.930 2.912 0.160
(0.262) (0.297)
Bahavior of respond 2.810 2.800 0.609
(0.421) (0.441)
Observations 1201 939
Notes: Stayers are young adults who stayed in all 3 waves since 2002 survey.  Leavers are young adults 
who were in 2002 survey but dropped out either in 2005 or 2006 survey.  P-value tests the null hypothesis
that the variable mean is not different across the two samples.  Attitude=1 if young adult's response is
hostile; Attitude=2 if young adult's response is neither hostile nor friendly; Attitude=3 if young adult's
response is friendly.  Bahavior=1 if young adult's response is not at all attentive; Bahavior=2 if young adult's




conditional probabilities from equation (4) are used to compute the joint probabilities that young 
adult i stay in survey s at t=2005, 2006.  Therefore, the joint probability is computed as follow: 
                                                                                
                    .  Hence, each young adult i at time t is assigned a weight,    
 
    
. 
 Table 3 presents the probit estimates of the conditional probabilities of young adults 
being in the survey in 2005 and 2006 (see Appendix).  These estimates are conditional on 
household pension recipients, household size, young adults’ demographic characteristics, and 
young adults’ response to the survey.  I found that OAP, household size, young adults age, 
gender, and attitude during the survey are statistically significant at 1% and 5% significance 
levels in explaining the probabilities of being in the survey.  For example, young adults who are 
living with a pension recipient in 2002 are likely to stay in the survey in 2005.  Also, young 
adults who attitude was not hostile but friendly in 2002 are most likely to remain in the survey in 
2005 and 2006.  Moreover, the larger households size in 2002 increase the probability of 
household members to stay in the survey in 2005. 
I.5 Results 
The results from estimating equation (2) are presented in table 4a, 5a, 6a, and 7a.  In table 4a, 
columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10 present the effect of any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts 
on labor force participation of young adult females and males without correcting for attrition.  In 
contrast, columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12 present the effect of any OAP, OAPFemale, and 
OAPMale receipts on labor force participation of young adult females and males correcting for 
attrition.  Tables 5a, 6a, and 7a follow the same format as table 4a.  Also, tables 4b, 5b, 6b, and 
7b present results from estimating equation (3) using similar format as tables 4a-7a as part of the 




assets as a robustness check as well as a way to reduce sampling variability in the estimator
8
.  In 
addition, I divided the sample by age (14-20 and 21-26) to focus on young adults who are most 
likely to either be employed or in school.  In South Africa, there are less than 3% of young adults 
aged 15-19 who are in the labor force because they are most likely in school.  Also, those who are 
aged 20-24 account for 14% of the labor force but they are 27% unemployed (Altman, 2007).   
 In table 4a, results show that any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts have no 
significant impact on labor force participation of young adults (females and males) aged 14-20.  
In table 4b, I show that the estimates shown in table 4a are robust to the inclusion of additional 
controls.  Any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts have no significant impact on labor 
force participation of young adults (females and males) aged 14-20.  
 The results from estimating equation (2) are presented in table 5a.  OAPFemale receipts 
reduce the probability of labor force participation of young adult males aged 21-26 by 15.7% 
without attrition correction at the 10% significance level; however, this result became 
insignificant after correcting for attrition.  In contrast, OAPMale receipts increase the probability 
of labor force participation of young adult males by 9.9% at the 10% significance level after 
correcting for attrition.  I show that the estimates shown in table 5a are robust to the inclusion of 
additional controls in table 5b.  Results indicate that OAPFemale receipts reduce the probability 
of labor force participation of young adult males aged 21-26 by 20.1% and 18.7% without and 
with attrition correction at the 5% significance level, respectively.  On the other hand, OAPMale 
receipts increase the probability of labor force participation of young adult males aged 21-26 by 
13.3% and 14.3% without and with attrition correction at the 10% and 5% significance levels, 
respectively.  
 In table 6a, results show the effect of any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale 
receipts on the probability of school enrollment of young adults (females and males) aged 
                                                             




14-20.  Results indicate that any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts have no significant 
impact on school enrollment of young adults (females and males) aged 14-20.  In table 6b, I show 
that the estimates shown in table 6a are robust to the inclusion of additional controls.  Any OAP, 
OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts have no significant impact on school enrollment of young 
adults (females and males) aged 14-20.  
 In table 7a, results indicate that OAPMale receipts reduce the probability of school 
enrollment of young adult males aged 21-26 by 12.0% and 12.8% without and with attrition 
correction at the 10% and 5% significance levels, respectively.  Inclusion of baseline covariates in 
table 7b shows that OAPMale receipts reduce the probability of school enrollment of young adult 
males by 17.5% and 18.4% at 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
I.6 Conclusion 
This paper presents evidence of the impact of any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts on 
labor force participation and school enrollment of young adult males and females aged 14-20 and 
21-26.  Using RDD identification strategy, I find that any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale 
receipts did not have any significant impact on labor force participation and school enrollment of 
young adult females and males aged 14-20.  In contrast, OAPFemale receipts have significant and 
negative impact on labor force participation of young adult males aged 21-26.  Although, 
OAPFemale receipts have positive impact on school enrollment of young adult males aged 21-26, 
these estimates were not statistically significant.  On the other hand, OAPMale receipts have 
positive and significant impact on labor force participation of young adult males aged 21-26 but 
negative and significant impact on school enrollment of young adult males aged 21-26.  
These results answer my earlier research questions:  Does OAP impact labor force 
participation and school enrollment of African young adults?  Does the effect of OAP differ by 
gender of the pension recipients?  Does the effect of OAP differ by gender of the African young 




enrollment of African young adults.  Also, the effects of OAP differ by gender of the pension 
recipients as evidence provided by these results.  These results also indicate that only African 
young adult males aged 21-26 and not African young adult females aged 21-26 were significantly 
affected when OAPFemale or OAPMale recipients were presented in the household.   
These results illustrates that even though OAP is targeted toward the elderly in South 
Africa as a way to alleviate poverty and improve their living standard, it has secondary effects on 
other household members.  In particular, these results are important because it suggests that OAP 
can improve African young adults’ transition into the labor market in time when young adults in 
South Africa and especially African young adults are faced with high unemployment. 
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Table 3: Attrition Probability during 2002-2006
Dependent Variable: Stay=1; Leave=0
Variables (2005|2002) (2006|2005, 2002)
OAP 0.273** -1.498
(0.106) (0.130)
Household size 0.066*** 0.007
(0.014) (0.016)
Young adults age -0.038*** -0.012
(0.013) (0.017)
Young adults gender 0.151*** -0.222**
(0.056) (0.088)













Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Wave 1 =2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.
Attitude=1 if young adult's response is hostile; Attitude=2 if young adult's response is neither
hostile nor friendly; Attitude=3 if young adult's response is friendly. Bahavior=1 if young adult's
response is not at all attentive; Bahavior=2 if young adult's response is somewhat attentive; 






Table 4a: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Labor Force Participation of Young Adults Aged 14-20 
Dependent Variable: Employed Young Adults 
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP -0.024 -0.054 -0.027 -0.051
(0.042) (0.048) (0.042) (0.050)
OAPFemale -0.012 -0.022 -0.012 -0.019
(0.040) (0.051) (0.041) (0.054)
OAPMale -0.013 -0.030 -0.014 -0.034
(0.051) (0.058) (0.053) (0.062)
Maxage -0.029** -0.040** -0.028** -0.046** -0.028** -0.037** -0.027** -0.043** -0.028** -0.036* -0.027** -0.043**
(0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.019)
Maxage^2 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.000* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.000* 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.091*** 0.099*** 0.091*** 0.094*** 0.091*** 0.099*** 0.091*** 0.094*** 0.091*** 0.100*** 0.091*** 0.094***
(0.028) (0.034) (0.029) (0.035) (0.028) (0.034) (0.029) (0.035) (0.027) (0.034) (0.029) (0.035)
Wave_4 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.236*** 0.233*** 0.241*** 0.243*** 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.241*** 0.244*** 0.235*** 0.235***
(0.034) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042) (0.034) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042) (0.034) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042)
Constant 0.515** 0.836*** 0.512** 0.929*** 0.499** 0.791*** 0.497** 0.891*** 0.492** 0.783** 0.490** 0.889***
(0.203) (0.300) (0.209) (0.311) (0.200) (0.296) (0.206) (0.309) (0.202) (0.301) (0.207) (0.312)
Observations 1,125 960 1,125 960 1,125 960 1,125 960 1,125 960 1,125 960
R-squared 0.114 0.109 0.110 0.104 0.114 0.108 0.109 0.103 0.114 0.108 0.109 0.103
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Employed young adults (females or males) equal 1 if young adults are employed, and 
0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female
household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age
of oldest household member, Maxage^2 is age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and






Table 4b: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Labor Force Participation of Young Adults Aged 14-20 Controlling for Baseline Covariates
Dependent Variable: Employed Young Adults 
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP -0.030 -0.025 -0.032 -0.025
(0.040) (0.044) (0.041) (0.046)
OAPFemale -0.019 0.019 -0.018 0.023
(0.039) (0.047) (0.040) (0.050)
OAPMale 0.001 -0.054 -0.003 -0.065
(0.048) (0.057) (0.050) (0.059)
Maxage -0.023* -0.029* -0.023* -0.033* -0.022* -0.026 -0.022* -0.030* -0.021* -0.028* -0.021* -0.032*
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017)
Maxage^2 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.060** 0.083** 0.060** 0.079** 0.060** 0.084** 0.060** 0.079** 0.060** 0.084** 0.060** 0.080**
(0.025) (0.036) (0.026) (0.037) (0.025) (0.036) (0.026) (0.037) (0.025) (0.036) (0.026) (0.037)
Wave_4 0.172*** 0.178*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.172*** 0.179*** 0.166*** 0.168*** 0.172*** 0.180*** 0.166*** 0.170***
(0.035) (0.042) (0.036) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042) (0.036) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042) (0.036) (0.042)
Age_15 0.000 0.026** 0.000 0.028** 0.000 0.027** 0.000 0.029** -0.000 0.026* -0.000 0.027*
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014)
Age_16 0.001 0.054 0.000 0.057 0.001 0.057 0.001 0.059 0.002 0.054 0.001 0.057
(0.009) (0.035) (0.009) (0.036) (0.009) (0.035) (0.009) (0.036) (0.009) (0.035) (0.009) (0.036)
Age_17 -0.020 -0.012 -0.019 -0.009 -0.020 -0.011 -0.019 -0.008 -0.020 -0.012 -0.019 -0.009
(0.013) (0.027) (0.013) (0.027) (0.013) (0.027) (0.013) (0.027) (0.013) (0.027) (0.013) (0.027)
Age_18 -0.018 0.064** -0.019 0.071** -0.018 0.066** -0.018 0.073*** -0.018 0.065** -0.018 0.072**
(0.016) (0.026) (0.015) (0.028) (0.016) (0.026) (0.015) (0.028) (0.016) (0.026) (0.015) (0.028)
Age_19 0.053** 0.061* 0.048* 0.068* 0.053** 0.065* 0.048* 0.071** 0.054** 0.062* 0.048* 0.068*
(0.025) (0.034) (0.024) (0.035) (0.025) (0.035) (0.024) (0.035) (0.025) (0.034) (0.024) (0.035)
Age_20 0.256*** 0.285*** 0.259*** 0.291*** 0.256*** 0.288*** 0.260*** 0.294*** 0.257*** 0.287*** 0.260*** 0.293***
(0.037) (0.042) (0.038) (0.043) (0.037) (0.041) (0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041) (0.038) (0.042)
Household size 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Children under 5 years old 0.027** 0.011 0.030** 0.010 0.027** 0.012 0.029** 0.011 0.027** 0.012 0.029** 0.011
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016)
Household head educated 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.005 0.002 -0.005 0.002 -0.005 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Marital status 0.010 -0.009 0.010 -0.010 0.010 -0.010 0.010 -0.011 0.009 -0.010 0.009 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Owning home 0.018 0.043 0.019 0.040 0.018 0.042 0.019 0.040 0.017 0.040 0.018 0.037
(0.022) (0.037) (0.022) (0.039) (0.022) (0.037) (0.022) (0.039) (0.021) (0.037) (0.021) (0.039)
Life insurance -0.001 -0.058** 0.001 -0.058** -0.001 -0.057** 0.001 -0.058** -0.001 -0.058** 0.001 -0.058**
(0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027)
Washing machine -0.013 0.008 -0.015 0.010 -0.014 0.006 -0.015 0.008 -0.013 0.004 -0.015 0.007
(0.030) (0.037) (0.029) (0.037) (0.030) (0.037) (0.029) (0.038) (0.030) (0.038) (0.029) (0.038)
Constant 0.335* 0.648** 0.336* 0.722** 0.319* 0.601** 0.321* 0.680** 0.305* 0.640** 0.310* 0.720***
(0.185) (0.268) (0.189) (0.280) (0.182) (0.265) (0.186) (0.278) (0.183) (0.264) (0.187) (0.274)
Observations 1,125 960 1,125 960 1,125 960 1,125 960 1,125 960 1,125 960
R-squared 0.223 0.187 0.224 0.185 0.223 0.187 0.224 0.185 0.223 0.188 0.223 0.186
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Employed young adults (females or males) equal 1 if young adults are employed, and 0 otherwise.  
OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household member is receiving 
OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member, Maxage^2 is 
age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline covariates: young adults age dummies,
household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, and Marital status of household member), and household assets (Household ownership of home,





Table 5a: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Labor Force Participation of Young Adults Aged 21-26
Dependent Variable: Employed Young Adults 
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP 0.078 -0.078 0.069 -0.065
(0.090) (0.080) (0.082) (0.078)
OAPFemale 0.118 -0.157* 0.107 -0.142
(0.091) (0.092) (0.088) (0.092)
OAPMale -0.111 0.089 -0.098 0.099*
(0.111) (0.056) (0.109) (0.051)
Maxage 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.016 -0.007 0.013
(0.031) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028)
Maxage^2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Maxage^3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.322*** 0.306*** 0.325*** 0.306*** 0.318*** 0.308*** 0.322*** 0.307*** 0.327*** 0.303*** 0.329*** 0.303***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.063) (0.056) (0.058) (0.057) (0.062) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.062) (0.056)
Wave_4 0.539*** 0.516*** 0.538*** 0.513*** 0.538*** 0.513*** 0.537*** 0.511*** 0.540*** 0.514*** 0.539*** 0.511***
(0.055) (0.052) (0.058) (0.052) (0.055) (0.052) (0.058) (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) (0.058) (0.052)
Constant 0.348 0.410 0.481 0.449 0.370 0.416 0.500 0.457 0.532 0.327 0.623 0.382
(0.466) (0.411) (0.454) (0.422) (0.473) (0.403) (0.453) (0.415) (0.456) (0.405) (0.438) (0.417)
Observations 563 577 563 577 563 577 563 577 563 577 563 577
R-squared 0.181 0.191 0.184 0.192 0.183 0.196 0.186 0.196 0.182 0.191 0.185 0.193
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Employed young adults (females or males) equal 1 if young adults are employed, and 
0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female
household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age
of oldest household member, Maxage^2 is age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and





Table 5b: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Labor Force Participation of Young Adults Aged 21-26 Controlling for Baseline Covariates
Dependent Variable: Employed Young Adults 
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP 0.040 -0.098 0.038 -0.088
(0.090) (0.078) (0.083) (0.075)
OAPFemale 0.108 -0.201** 0.103 -0.187**
(0.082) (0.086) (0.078) (0.086)
OAPMale -0.132 0.133* -0.124 0.143**
(0.099) (0.067) (0.096) (0.062)
Maxage 0.015 -0.004 0.008 -0.008 0.017 -0.004 0.010 -0.008 0.006 0.003 0.000 -0.002
(0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Maxage^2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Maxage^3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.216*** 0.185*** 0.221*** 0.179*** 0.212*** 0.185*** 0.217*** 0.179*** 0.218*** 0.179*** 0.222*** 0.174***
(0.065) (0.062) (0.067) (0.063) (0.065) (0.062) (0.067) (0.063) (0.064) (0.062) (0.067) (0.063)
Wave_4 0.378*** 0.359*** 0.378*** 0.350*** 0.379*** 0.353*** 0.379*** 0.345*** 0.378*** 0.356*** 0.378*** 0.347***
(0.068) (0.063) (0.069) (0.063) (0.069) (0.063) (0.069) (0.063) (0.068) (0.063) (0.069) (0.064)
Age_22 0.045 0.168*** 0.043 0.172*** 0.044 0.174*** 0.042 0.177*** 0.043 0.171*** 0.041 0.176***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057)
Age_23 0.234*** 0.292*** 0.219*** 0.298*** 0.229*** 0.295*** 0.216*** 0.301*** 0.231*** 0.299*** 0.216*** 0.305***
(0.054) (0.061) (0.056) (0.062) (0.054) (0.060) (0.056) (0.062) (0.053) (0.061) (0.055) (0.063)
Age_24 0.240*** 0.298*** 0.230*** 0.309*** 0.239*** 0.303*** 0.228*** 0.313*** 0.240*** 0.306*** 0.230*** 0.316***
(0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.065) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.065) (0.061) (0.065) (0.061) (0.066)
Age_25 0.349*** 0.283*** 0.344*** 0.291*** 0.350*** 0.290*** 0.346*** 0.296*** 0.355*** 0.276*** 0.349*** 0.285***
(0.055) (0.060) (0.055) (0.061) (0.054) (0.060) (0.055) (0.062) (0.053) (0.059) (0.054) (0.061)
Age_26 0.272*** 0.257*** 0.276*** 0.265*** 0.271*** 0.265*** 0.276*** 0.273*** 0.274*** 0.259*** 0.279*** 0.268***
(0.082) (0.063) (0.073) (0.065) (0.082) (0.062) (0.073) (0.064) (0.081) (0.064) (0.073) (0.066)
Household size -0.014 0.002 -0.016 0.004 -0.015 0.002 -0.016* 0.004 -0.014 0.003 -0.016* 0.004
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Children under 5 years old 0.048** 0.067*** 0.053** 0.066*** 0.048** 0.069*** 0.052** 0.068*** 0.050** 0.066*** 0.055** 0.065***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
Household head educated -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Marital status -0.005 -0.014 -0.007 -0.015 -0.006 -0.013 -0.008 -0.014 -0.007 -0.012 -0.009 -0.013
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Owning home 0.102 0.067 0.109* 0.068 0.099 0.065 0.107* 0.067 0.099 0.067 0.107* 0.068
(0.064) (0.049) (0.063) (0.051) (0.064) (0.049) (0.063) (0.051) (0.065) (0.050) (0.064) (0.051)
Life insurance 0.015 -0.057 0.012 -0.052 0.017 -0.060 0.013 -0.055 0.018 -0.056 0.014 -0.050
(0.054) (0.048) (0.053) (0.048) (0.054) (0.048) (0.053) (0.048) (0.054) (0.048) (0.053) (0.047)
Washing machine -0.075 0.050 -0.087* 0.035 -0.080 0.053 -0.092* 0.038 -0.075 0.041 -0.085* 0.027
(0.052) (0.053) (0.049) (0.056) (0.051) (0.052) (0.047) (0.055) (0.050) (0.053) (0.047) (0.056)
Constant 0.274 0.541 0.389 0.613 0.246 0.549 0.368 0.621 0.424 0.422 0.512 0.512
(0.457) (0.415) (0.439) (0.423) (0.455) (0.407) (0.431) (0.415) (0.452) (0.403) (0.429) (0.412)
Observations 563 577 563 577 563 577 563 577 563 577 563 577
R-squared 0.276 0.271 0.281 0.275 0.279 0.279 0.284 0.280 0.279 0.272 0.284 0.276
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Employed young adults (females or males) equal 1 if young adults are employed, and 0 otherwise.  
OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household member is receiving 
OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member, Maxage^2 is 
age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline covariates: young adults age dummies,
household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, and Marital status of household member), and household assets (Household ownership of home,





Table 6a: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on School Enrollment of Young Adults Aged 14-20
Dependent Variable: Young Adults in School 
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP 0.051 0.076 0.058 0.072
(0.044) (0.049) (0.045) (0.050)
OAPFemale 0.037 0.048 0.044 0.043
(0.045) (0.054) (0.046) (0.057)
OAPMale -0.003 0.023 -0.004 0.029
(0.056) (0.060) (0.059) (0.064)
Maxage 0.047*** 0.041** 0.049*** 0.047** 0.046*** 0.038** 0.048*** 0.045** 0.043*** 0.036* 0.046*** 0.043**
(0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020)
Maxage^2 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 -0.026 -0.035 -0.022 -0.025 -0.025 -0.035 -0.022 -0.025 -0.025 -0.036 -0.021 -0.026
(0.031) (0.036) (0.032) (0.037) (0.031) (0.036) (0.032) (0.037) (0.031) (0.036) (0.032) (0.037)
Wave_4 -0.179*** -0.184*** -0.172*** -0.171*** -0.179*** -0.185*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.179*** -0.186*** -0.171*** -0.173***
(0.035) (0.044) (0.036) (0.044) (0.035) (0.044) (0.036) (0.044) (0.035) (0.044) (0.036) (0.044)
Constant 0.135 0.052 0.090 -0.067 0.156 0.097 0.110 -0.027 0.187 0.131 0.139 -0.006
(0.234) (0.297) (0.247) (0.311) (0.231) (0.295) (0.244) (0.309) (0.227) (0.303) (0.238) (0.315)
Observations 1,174 1,002 1,174 1,002 1,174 1,002 1,174 1,002 1,174 1,002 1,174 1,002
R-squared 0.054 0.065 0.053 0.064 0.054 0.064 0.052 0.063 0.053 0.063 0.051 0.063
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Young adults in school (females or males) equal 1 if young adults are currently enrolled in school,  
and 0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female
household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest
household member, Maxage^2 is age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  








Table 6b: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on School Enrollment of Young Adults Aged 14-20 Controlling for Baseline Covariates
Dependent Variable: Young Adults in School 
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP 0.047 0.027 0.052 0.028
(0.042) (0.045) (0.043) (0.047)
OAPFemale 0.035 -0.023 0.038 -0.027
(0.041) (0.050) (0.042) (0.052)
OAPMale -0.007 0.065 -0.005 0.080
(0.048) (0.059) (0.052) (0.061)
Maxage 0.034*** 0.025 0.035*** 0.029* 0.033*** 0.021 0.034** 0.026 0.031** 0.024 0.032** 0.028*
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016)
Maxage^2 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.034 -0.007 0.034 0.000 0.034 -0.008 0.035 -0.000 0.035 -0.008 0.035 -0.001
(0.030) (0.038) (0.030) (0.038) (0.030) (0.038) (0.031) (0.038) (0.030) (0.038) (0.030) (0.038)
Wave_4 -0.056 -0.084* -0.050 -0.072 -0.055 -0.085* -0.050 -0.072 -0.055 -0.086* -0.049 -0.074
(0.039) (0.045) (0.039) (0.045) (0.038) (0.045) (0.039) (0.045) (0.038) (0.045) (0.039) (0.045)
Age_15 -0.001 -0.028** -0.001 -0.031** -0.000 -0.029** -0.001 -0.032** 0.000 -0.028** -0.000 -0.029**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.015)
Age_16 -0.004 -0.063* -0.002 -0.067* -0.004 -0.066* -0.002 -0.070* -0.005 -0.063* -0.003 -0.066*
(0.010) (0.037) (0.010) (0.038) (0.010) (0.037) (0.010) (0.038) (0.010) (0.037) (0.010) (0.038)
Age_17 -0.026 -0.033 -0.025 -0.037 -0.026 -0.035 -0.025 -0.039 -0.026 -0.034 -0.026 -0.037
(0.018) (0.030) (0.017) (0.030) (0.018) (0.029) (0.017) (0.029) (0.018) (0.030) (0.017) (0.030)
Age_18 -0.062*** -0.145*** -0.058*** -0.155*** -0.063*** -0.148*** -0.059*** -0.157*** -0.063*** -0.146*** -0.059*** -0.155***
(0.022) (0.030) (0.022) (0.031) (0.022) (0.030) (0.022) (0.031) (0.022) (0.030) (0.022) (0.031)
Age_19 -0.161*** -0.141*** -0.152*** -0.151*** -0.161*** -0.145*** -0.152*** -0.155*** -0.162*** -0.141*** -0.152*** -0.151***
(0.030) (0.039) (0.029) (0.040) (0.030) (0.039) (0.029) (0.040) (0.030) (0.038) (0.029) (0.039)
Age_20 -0.408*** -0.433*** -0.413*** -0.445*** -0.408*** -0.436*** -0.414*** -0.448*** -0.409*** -0.435*** -0.415*** -0.447***
(0.041) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045)
Household size -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.005 -0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Children under 5 years old -0.030** -0.012 -0.034** -0.012 -0.030** -0.012 -0.033** -0.012 -0.030** -0.012 -0.033** -0.012
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017)
Household head educated -0.001 0.007* -0.001 0.008* -0.001 0.008* -0.001 0.008* -0.000 0.007* -0.000 0.008*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Marital status -0.005 0.012 -0.005 0.012 -0.005 0.013 -0.005 0.013 -0.004 0.012 -0.003 0.013
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Owning home -0.036 -0.047 -0.041 -0.042 -0.037 -0.046 -0.042 -0.041 -0.035 -0.044 -0.040 -0.039
(0.025) (0.039) (0.025) (0.041) (0.025) (0.039) (0.025) (0.041) (0.025) (0.039) (0.025) (0.041)
Life insurance 0.017 0.074*** 0.013 0.074** 0.017 0.073** 0.013 0.073** 0.017 0.073** 0.013 0.074**
(0.023) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028)
Washing machine 0.003 -0.017 0.005 -0.018 0.004 -0.015 0.005 -0.015 0.004 -0.013 0.005 -0.014
(0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.042)
Constant 0.499** 0.359 0.473** 0.279 0.518** 0.411 0.492** 0.327 0.544*** 0.367 0.515** 0.281
(0.206) (0.252) (0.214) (0.264) (0.203) (0.252) (0.210) (0.264) (0.202) (0.249) (0.208) (0.258)
Observations 1,174 1,002 1,174 1,002 1,174 1,002 1,174 1,002 1,174 1,002 1,174 1,002
R-squared 0.223 0.209 0.229 0.215 0.223 0.209 0.229 0.215 0.222 0.210 0.228 0.216
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Young adults in school (females or males) equal 1 if young adults are currently enrolled in school, 
and 0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household 
member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member, 
Maxage^2 is  age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline covariates: young adults 
age dummies, household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, and Marital status of household member), and household assets (Household ownership






Table 7a:  Impact of Old Age Pension Program on School Enrollment of Young Adults Aged 21-26
Dependent Variable: Young Adults in School 
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP -0.075 0.023 -0.067 0.013
(0.093) (0.082) (0.085) (0.080)
OAPFemale -0.114 0.098 -0.105 0.087
(0.095) (0.095) (0.091) (0.094)
OAPMale 0.110 -0.120* 0.099 -0.128**
(0.119) (0.062) (0.116) (0.058)
Maxage -0.007 -0.017 0.001 -0.019 -0.006 -0.016 0.002 -0.017 0.004 -0.021 0.009 -0.022
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Maxage^2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Maxage^3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 -0.096* -0.050 -0.093* -0.053 -0.093* -0.051 -0.090 -0.053 -0.102* -0.051 -0.098* -0.054
(0.056) (0.051) (0.056) (0.051) (0.055) (0.052) (0.055) (0.051) (0.055) (0.051) (0.055) (0.051)
Wave_4 -0.321*** -0.257*** -0.313*** -0.257*** -0.320*** -0.254*** -0.313*** -0.254*** -0.322*** -0.258*** -0.314*** -0.257***
(0.054) (0.044) (0.053) (0.043) (0.054) (0.044) (0.053) (0.043) (0.054) (0.044) (0.053) (0.043)
Constant 0.339 0.469 0.203 0.480 0.317 0.441 0.184 0.454 0.172 0.531 0.075 0.528
(0.427) (0.407) (0.417) (0.417) (0.431) (0.402) (0.415) (0.412) (0.408) (0.401) (0.396) (0.411)
Observations 606 640 606 640 606 640 606 640 606 640 606 640
R-squared 0.105 0.088 0.104 0.088 0.107 0.091 0.106 0.090 0.106 0.091 0.105 0.091
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Young adults in school (females or males) equal 1 if young adults are currently enrolled in school,  
and 0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female
household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest
household member, Maxage^2 is age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  




Table 7b: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on School Enrollment of Young Adults Aged 21-26 Controlling for Baseline Covariates
Dependent Variable: Young Adults in School 
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP -0.041 0.034 -0.039 0.026
(0.093) (0.084) (0.086) (0.081)
OAPFemale -0.112 0.139 -0.107 0.127
(0.086) (0.093) (0.083) (0.092)
OAPMale 0.139 -0.175** 0.134 -0.184***
(0.104) (0.072) (0.101) (0.068)
Maxage -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.013 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 0.004 -0.008
(0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Maxage^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Maxage^3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.007 0.054 0.008 0.055 0.010 0.055 0.011 0.056 0.004 0.054 0.006 0.055
(0.066) (0.057) (0.065) (0.058) (0.066) (0.057) (0.065) (0.058) (0.065) (0.056) (0.064) (0.057)
Wave_4 -0.168** -0.111** -0.164** -0.107* -0.169** -0.104* -0.165** -0.101* -0.169** -0.111** -0.164** -0.106*
(0.072) (0.055) (0.070) (0.055) (0.072) (0.055) (0.070) (0.056) (0.071) (0.055) (0.069) (0.056)
Age_22 -0.045 -0.190*** -0.040 -0.197*** -0.045 -0.193*** -0.039 -0.199*** -0.044 -0.195*** -0.038 -0.201***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.054)
Age_23 -0.232*** -0.305*** -0.215*** -0.312*** -0.228*** -0.306*** -0.212*** -0.314*** -0.229*** -0.313*** -0.212*** -0.320***
(0.056) (0.059) (0.057) (0.061) (0.056) (0.059) (0.057) (0.061) (0.054) (0.060) (0.056) (0.062)
Age_24 -0.240*** -0.311*** -0.227*** -0.323*** -0.239*** -0.314*** -0.226*** -0.325*** -0.240*** -0.318*** -0.227*** -0.329***
(0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.061) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.059) (0.064) (0.060) (0.064)
Age_25 -0.357*** -0.294*** -0.349*** -0.303*** -0.358*** -0.300*** -0.352*** -0.308*** -0.363*** -0.290*** -0.355*** -0.299***
(0.055) (0.058) (0.056) (0.060) (0.055) (0.058) (0.056) (0.060) (0.055) (0.058) (0.056) (0.060)
Age_26 -0.272*** -0.278*** -0.274*** -0.288*** -0.271*** -0.284*** -0.275*** -0.293*** -0.274*** -0.281*** -0.278*** -0.291***
(0.084) (0.062) (0.076) (0.064) (0.084) (0.061) (0.076) (0.063) (0.083) (0.063) (0.075) (0.065)
Household size 0.014 -0.002 0.015 -0.003 0.015 -0.002 0.016* -0.003 0.014 -0.002 0.016* -0.003
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Children under 5 years old -0.041* -0.057** -0.046** -0.057** -0.041* -0.058** -0.046** -0.059*** -0.043* -0.057** -0.048** -0.057**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Household head educated 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Marital status 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.013 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.014 0.006
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Owning home -0.109* -0.048 -0.114* -0.050 -0.107* -0.048 -0.112* -0.050 -0.107* -0.052 -0.114* -0.054
(0.060) (0.046) (0.059) (0.047) (0.060) (0.046) (0.059) (0.047) (0.061) (0.046) (0.060) (0.047)
Life insurance -0.045 0.081 -0.049 0.074 -0.046 0.085* -0.049 0.078 -0.048 0.082 -0.051 0.074
(0.054) (0.050) (0.053) (0.049) (0.054) (0.049) (0.052) (0.049) (0.054) (0.049) (0.053) (0.048)
Washing machine 0.091 -0.029 0.103* -0.014 0.095* -0.033 0.107** -0.019 0.090* -0.023 0.101** -0.008
(0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.052) (0.051) (0.055) (0.054) (0.052) (0.051) (0.054)
Constant 0.404 0.364 0.269 0.349 0.432 0.327 0.289 0.316 0.259 0.459 0.150 0.426
(0.435) (0.398) (0.427) (0.401) (0.427) (0.393) (0.417) (0.397) (0.417) (0.385) (0.409) (0.390)
Observations 606 640 606 640 606 640 606 640 606 640 606 640
R-squared 0.200 0.176 0.201 0.180 0.203 0.181 0.203 0.184 0.203 0.182 0.204 0.185
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Young adults in school (females or males) equal 1 if young adults are currently enrolled in school, 
and 0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household 
member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member, 
Maxage^2 is  age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline covariates: young adults 
age dummies, household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, and Marital status of household member), and household assets (Household ownership







THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CASH TRANSFERS ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF YOUNG 
ADULTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
II.1 Introduction 
There is a striking correlation between poverty and income shocks on the one hand and 
HIV/AIDS on the other hand (e.g. UNAIDS, 2008).  HIV/AIDS (or illness in general) can push 
people and households into poverty, by reducing household labor supply and/or by increasing 
medical expenses.  On the other hand, there is increasing evidence showing that transactional 
sexual activities, one of the channels through which HIV spread (Hallman, 2004; Dunkle et al. 
2004; Gillespie et al., 2007), increase in response to income shocks (Dinkelman, Lam and 
Leibbrandt, 2008; Robinson and Yeh, 2011).  The evidence suggests that when faced with 
economic hardship women are more likely to trade sexual favors for money and/or gifts 
(Silberschmidt and Rasch, 2001; Luke, 2002; Hunter 2002; Kaufman and Stavrou, 2002; Dunkle 
et al. 2004; Dinkelman, Lam and Leibbrandt, 2008; Robinson and Yeh, 2012).  Hence, by 
providing a cushion against unanticipated income loss, social protection could potentially reduce 





While many existing social protection schemes were designed to primarily influence 
sexual behaviors, their potential to contribute to a comprehensive HIV response is increasingly 
recognized.  Baird et al. (2010) show that in Malawi, young girls who received cash transfers 
were less likely to engage in sexual intercourse with older men, increase condom use, less likely 
to get pregnant or married early, and reduce the number of multiple partners.  In a slightly 
different context, De Walque et al. (2012) demonstrate that conditional cash transfers (a particular 
form of social cash transfers) can be used to incentivize people to remain free of sexually 
transmitted diseases, providing strong evidence that transfer recipients indeed altered their sexual 
behaviors.  Cash transfers whether conditional or unconditional
9
 are one form of social transfers.  
Furthermore, De Walque et al. (2012) experiment was designed specifically to alter sexual 
behaviors.  There is no evidence that these findings hold either for other forms of cash transfers or 
in a non-experimental setting, i.e. when the policy targets a more general population.  
This paper fills these gaps in the literature.  I investigate the effect of an Old Age Pension 
(OAP) program on sexual behavior of young adults in South Africa.  I focus on the impact of 
OAP on sexual behaviors (sexual debut, number of multiple partners, condom use, and marital 
status) of African young adults, and whether that impact differs by gender of the young adult and 
by gender of the pension recipient.  This is important because young adults in South Africa have 
one of the highest HIV prevalence rate in the world and it is particular high among individuals 
aged 15-24 who account for 14% of all HIV global infections in 2001 (UNICEF-UNAIDS-WHO, 
2002).  Also, HIV infection among young adults who are entering the labor market is 13% and it 
is 33% for all females aged 25-29 (Altman, 2007).   
Two features of my study are substantially different from Baird et al. (2010) and from De 
Walque et al. (2012).  First, as social cash transfers, OAP differs substantially from unconditional 
                                                             
9
 Conditional cash transfers require recipient households to use educational or health services for the 
benefit of children living in the household (e.g. Mexico’s Oportunidades require 85 percent children’s 
school attendance rates) (World Bank, 2009).  In contrast, unconditional cash transfers do not require 




cash transfers.  OAP targets old people unlike unconditional cash transfers that usually target 
school age or younger children.  Moreover, unlike conditional cash transfers OAP does not seek 
to alter the recipient behavior.  Second, the policy experiment that I investigate, the South African 
OAP, is not a controlled experiment.  Also, two closely related previous studies by Dinkelman et 
al. (2007, 2008) used the same CAPS data to examine the link between negative economic shocks 
and household and community level poverty on risky sexual behavior of young adults and found 
little evidence of this relationship.  This paper differ significantly from Dinkelman et al. (2007, 
2008) in that I examine the effect of permanent income shock (OAP) on sexual behavior of young 
adults instead of negative income shocks (e.g. death, job loss, and illness) used by Dinkelman et 
al. (2007, 2008).  Moreover, my focus is on the effect of providing social cash transfers rather 
than on how households react to negative income shocks as in Dinkelman et al. (2007, 2008).   
 Using Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) identification strategy, I find that young 
adult females who live with OAPFemale recipients become sexually active later 15.3% on 
average.  There were no significant impact of any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts on 
self-reported condom use and number of multiple partners of young adults.  Young adult females 
and males who live with OAPFemale recipients reduce their probability of getting married by 
9.1% and 24.1% on average, respectively.  On the contrary, young adult females and males who 
live with OAPMale recipients increase their probability of getting married by 21.4% and 23.8% 
on average, respectively.  The evidence that OAP alters sexual behaviors implies that previous 
evidence on the role of unconditional cash transfers on sexual behaviors applies to other forms of 
social cash transfers as well.  Furthermore, to some extent what really matters is the income effect 
and not the conditionality per se.  These results also provide some suggestive evidence that 
previous findings from randomized control trial (e.g. Baird et al. 2010, De Walque et al., 2012) 





II.2 The South African Old-Age Pension Program 
South Africa’s non-contributory state pension was introduced and restricted in 1928 to Whites 
and Colors as a safety-net for those who did not have private pensions as they reached 
retirement.  This non-contributory state pension was extended to Africans and Asians in 1944 
with limited and discriminatory entitlement standards and benefits (Sagner, 1998).  
Discriminatory entitlement benefits were withdrawn from Africans who had income larger than 
700 rand compared to Whites 2250 rand, and Whites had 10 times the level of benefits as 
compared to Africans (Duflo, 2003).  Also, White pensioners received their pension through 
mail compared to Africans who had to be at a particular location in order to receive their pension 
and it was sometimes impossible for Africans to receive their pension if they lived in far rural 
areas of South Africa.  Moreover, the government manipulated Africans’ age data to exclude 
individuals from the computer; thus, reducing the number of eligible pensioners as well as the 
cost associated with the pension program (Lund, 1993). 
 OAP is funded through taxation and it is means-tested on an individual’s income and 
assets
10
.  The maximum benefit in 1993 was 370 rand per month and that increased in 1998 to 
470 rand per month (Case and Deaton, 1998).  In 2010 and 2011, OAP payout increased to 1080 
and 1140 rand per month (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2010; South Africa Social Security Agency, 
2011/12).
11
  This scheme mainly targets poor individuals and age is the primary instrument used 
to determine pension eligibility.  Hence, women over 60 years old and men over 65 years old are 
eligible for the pension
12
.  About 14 percent of White women and 7 percent of White man 
                                                             
10  Means-testing only depend on elderly income and assets and not on the income of other household 
members.  See Case and Deaton (1998) for more detail on how the means-test is implemented.  
 
11
  These incomes are about half the average African household income and twice the median per capita 
income among Africans. 
12  Although age is the primary instrument used to determine pension-eligible individuals, individuals who 
are closer to this eligibility criterion may increase their reported age to receive the pension benefits.  The 




receive OAP.  By contrast, 80 percent of African women and 77 of African men reported 
receiving OAP (Case and Deaton, 1998).   
II.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used for this paper is the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS)
13
.  CAPS is a longitudinal 
study of the lives of a representative sample of young adults aged 14-22 that live in the Cape 
Town Metropolitan area of South Africa.  The aim of this longitudinal study was to document 
the transition from adolescents to adulthood in post-apartheid South Africa.  Particularly, the 
survey intended to track the adolescents as they move through school, enter into the labor 
market, move into their own households, and start their own families.  
There were approximately 5,250 households and 4,752 young adults who were randomly 
selected and interviewed from 2002-2006.  In wave 1 (2002), all young adults and their 
household members as well as other households that did not have members between 14-22 years 
old were interviewed.  Wave 2a and 2b re-interviewed a third and two-thirds of the young adults 
in Cape Town Metropolitan area in 2003 and 2004, respectively.  In wave 3 (2005), the full 
young adults sample and approximately 2,000 co-resident parents of young adults were 
interviewed.  In wave 4 (2006), the full young adults sample and a sample of older adults and all 
children born to female young adults were also interviewed.  There were up to three young 
adults who were interviewed in every household. 
 The drawback of this panel survey as any other panel survey is attrition over time.  The 
overall response rates of young adults in wave 2, 3, and 4 were 83%, 74%, and 72%, 
respectively.  The attrition rate was the largest for the White young adults, followed by Africans 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
13
  The Cape Area Panel Study Waves 1-2-3-4 were collected between 2002 and 2006 by the University of 
 Cape Town and the University of Michigan, with funding provided by the US National Institute for Child 





and Colors.  Successful response rates in wave 4 for Whites, Africans, and Colors were 41.8%, 
74.2%, and 79.5%, respectively.  The main reason given for non-response in African households 
was moving within South Africa.  I used wave 1 (2002), wave 3 (2005), and wave 4 (2006) for 
my descriptive statistics and empirical analyses.  Also, I used inverse probability weighting 
(IPW) method to correct for potential biases from sample attrition (Wooldridge, 2001).  Table 1 
presents household and individual level descriptive statistics, by reported OAP status and 
gender-specific age eligibility.  Membership in a household was defined as living in the 
household for more than 15 days of the last 30 days.   
 In table 1, panel 1 shows that household size, children under 5 years old, children 6-15 
years old, and age of oldest household member are larger for pension recipients compared to 
non-pension recipient households.  Female pensioners had larger household size, more children 
6-13 years old and slightly older compared to male pensioners.  On the other hand, male 
pensioners had more children under 5 years old compared to female pensioners.  I observe from 
table 1 that females who reported not receiving a pension but who are eligible are just around the 
cut off age of 60.  This means that they are turning 60 or just close to turning 60.  There were 39 
females who reported not receiving a pension but who are eligible.  The same observation can be 
made for males older than 65 who reported not receiving a pension.  They are just on average 
around the cut off eligibility age of 65; thus, they may have just turned 65 or are close to turning 
65.  There were 25 males who reported not receiving a pension but who are eligible.  In total, 
there were 64 individuals (females and males) who reported not receiving a pension but who are 
eligible and they constitute 1.84% of the data.  Also, 11 individuals reported receiving OAP even 
though they are not eligible and they constitute 1.97% of the data.  
 Table 1, panel 2 describes young adults’ age, sexual activities, and marital status.  
Pension recipient households had more young adults using condom on average (50.6%) 




are slightly older but they are on average less likely to sexual debut (71.8%) compared to young 
adults in non-pension recipient households (74.3%). 
 
Also, young adults living in pensioner households are less likely to have multiple partners on 
average (2.7%) compared to young adults in non-pensioner households (2.9%).  In addition, 
young adults in pensioner households tend to delay marriage (69.3%) compared to young adults 
in non-pensioner households (59.6%).  
II.4 Empirical Model and Identification Strategy 
To evaluate the impact of OAP on sexual behavior of young adults, I will ideally want to estimate 
the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression: 
                                                                                                            (1) 
In equation (1), i indicates individual young adult in household h.  The variable     is a dummy 
variable representing the outcome of interest (sexual debut, number of multiple partners, condom 
use, and marital status),      is a dummy variable indicating whether a household member 
Table 1: Household Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard Deviation)
OAP Receipt Recorded: No Yes
Age-Eligible Members: None Yes: Female(s) only Yes: Male(s) only Yes: Both None Yes: Female(s) only Yes: Male(s) only Yes: Both
Panel 1: Household Composition
Household size 6.095 7.615 6.960 7.359 6.090 8.168 7.144 7.991
(2.663) (3.384) (2.150) (2.962) (1.375) (3.598) (2.508) (3.453)
Children under 5 years old 0.649 0.615 0.680 0.641 0.273 0.829 0.948 0.850
(0.860) (0.747) (0.557) (0.675) (0.467) (1.053) (1.286) (1.097)
Children 6-15 years old 0.890 1.025 0.840 0.953 0.636 1.091 0.814 1.043
(0.988) (1.013) (0.943) (0.983) (0.809) (1.127) (1.044) (1.117)
Age of oldest household member 44.735 60.795 65.520 62.641 59.818 71.145 71.123 71.141
(10.241) (1.260) (0.509) (2.541) (1.779) (8.036) (5.457) (7.647)
Panel 2: Young Adults
Age 19.883 19.384 21.240 20.109 20.727 19.903 20.381 19.986
(3.038) (03.507) (3.166) (3.474) (3.717) (3.223) (2.852) (3.165)
Ever had sex 0.743 0.657 0.706 0.673 0.500 0.712 0.747 0.718
(0.437) (0.482) (0.470) (0.474) (0.535) (0.453) (0.438) (0.450)
Multiple partners 1.434 1.500 1.300 1.409 1.714 1.460 1.324 1.435
(1.213) (0.933) (0.733) (0.844) (1.254) (1.113) (0.891) (1.077)
Condom use 0.662 0.880 0.545 0.723 0.667 0.669 0.683 0.671
(0.473) (0.3312) (0.510) (0.452) (0.516) (0.471) (0.469) (0.470)
 Married 0.404 0.357 0.500 0.417 0.636 0.206 0.639 0.307
(0.491) (0.488) (0.513) (0.498) (0.505) (0.405) (0.483) (0.462)




receives pension,     is a vector of young adult and household characteristics, and     is the error 
term.  However, the OLS estimates of equation (1) will be biased if there is a systematic 
difference between pension-receiving and non-pension receiving households (e.g. pension-
receiving households are older on average compared to non-pension receiving household) 
(Bertrand et al., 2003; Sienaert, 2008).  To address this issue, OAP identification in the survey 
made it possible to employ RDD to estimate the causal effect of OAP on sexual debut, number 
of multiple partners, condom use, and marital status of young adults.   
 RDD was first introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) and later implemented 
by economists in the early 1990s to estimate program effect in a wide variety of economic 
contexts (Lee and Lemieux, 2009).  The goal of this paper is to examine the causal effect of OAP 
on sexual behavior of young adults.  This estimation is made possible by age-eligibility rule of 
OAP for women and men at 60 and 65 years old, respectively.  The causal effect is estimated 
as the discontinuity on sexual behavior of young adults at the threshold of woman or man 
pension-eligibility age at 60 or 65, respectively.  The idea is that in the absence of OAP, age 
of oldest woman or man in the household will impact sexual debut, number of multiple 
partners, condom use, and marital status of young adults in a continuous fashion and 
ascribing any jump away from the trend at age 60 or 65 to the pension.   
 Also, this approach relies on the idea that households around the cutoff points have 
similar characteristics except for the pension status.  RDD requires mild assumptions and its 
inferences are potentially more credible compared to other non-experimental approaches such as 
difference-in-differences or instrumental variables (Lee and Lemieux, 2009).  Moreover, Lee 
(2008) proved that there is no need to assume that isolated treatment variation is “as good as 
randomized” but randomized variation occurs because the agents are unable to precisely 
manipulate or control the assignment variable near the known cutoff point.  Thus, given the age-




household member” and figures 1, 2, and 3 (see Appendix) confirm that I can exploit sharp RDD 
in the “treatment” (sexual debut, multiple partners, condom use, and marital status) as a 
function of “OAP receipts” or “age of oldest household member”.  Also, figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 
(see Appendix) provide confirmation that there is an effect of the outcome of interests 
(sexual debut, multiple partners, condom use, and marital status) around the cutoff age of 
oldest household member.  Although these figures provide some confirmation regarding the 
nature of the data in term of assignment and treatment variables, they are not enough to 
establish any causal effect of OAP on sexual behavior young adults.   
To quantify this causal effect, I estimate sharp RDD as follow: 
                                               
       
                                           (2) 
In equation (2), i indicates individual young adult in household h.  The variable     is a dummy 
variable representing the outcome of interest (sexual debut, number of multiple partners, 
condom use, and marital status),      is a dummy variable indicating whether a household 
member receives pension,    is age of oldest household member,   
  is age-squared of oldest 
household member,   
  is age-cubed of oldest household member,    is wave 1, 3, and 4 (2002, 
2005, and 2006) respectively, and     is the error term.   
II.4.1 Internal Validity 
One of the underlying assumptions of RDD is that as a result of local random assignment “age-
eligibility rule of OAP” (women at 60 and men at 65), individuals should not be able to 
manipulate the assignment variable.  Although, I cannot test this directly, a graphical 
representation of the raw data using different baseline covariates as outcome variables against 
assignment variable “age-eligibility rule of OAP” can provide some validity to the RDD that 
there is no discontinuity around the neighborhood of the cutoff point.  Figures 8 to 13 (see 




household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head 
educated, Marital status of household member) and household assets (Household ownership of 
home, Life insurance, and Washing machine).   
 By construct, RDD does not need any covariates due to the assumption that around the 
cutoff points, households exhibit similar characteristics and as such assignment to treatment is 
independent of covariates and the estimate of the treatment effect is consistent (Lee and 
Lemieux, 2009).  To ensure that my results are not sensitive to the inclusion of covariates, I 
estimated the following sharp RDD equation: 
                             
       
                                           (3) 
In equation (3), i indicates individual young adult in household h.  The variable     is a dummy 
variable representing the outcome of interest (sexual debut, number of multiple partners, 
condom use, marital status),      is a dummy variable indicating whether a household 
member receives pension,    is age of oldest household member,   
  is age-squared of oldest 
household member,   
  is age-cubed of oldest household member,     is a vector of young adult 
and household characteristics,    is wave 1, 3, and 4 (2002, 2005, and 2006) respectively, and     
is the error term.   
II.4.2 Attrition: Test and Correction 
While the 2002 sample was drawn randomly from the household that had young adults aged 14-
22, attrition across waves as the survey progress is evidence.  The overall response rates of 
young adults in wave 2, 3, and 4 were 83%, 74%, and 72%, respectively.  The attrition rate was 
the largest for the White young adults, followed by Africans and Colors.  Successful response 
rates in wave 4 for Whites, Africans, and Colors were 41.8%, 74.2%, and 79.5%, respectively.  I 
only focus on African young adults and their households in this study.  The main reason given 




 Table 2 presents the summary statistics by attrition using 2002 data.  On average, stayers 
live in a larger household, stay in a household with more pension recipients, are less likely to 
complete Matric, are younger, show better attitude and behavior during the survey interview, and 
are in households with more young adult males.  Testing for differences between the two samples 
of stayers and leavers, the p-value is statistically significant at 1% for the following variables: 
OAP, household size, and young adults’ age.  It appears that young adults in my analysis sample; 
that is, stayers are not a random sample from the original sample in 2002.  Therefore, I need to 
correct for any potential attrition bias that may underestimate or overestimate the effects of each 
factor on sexual debut, number of multiple partners, condom use, and marital status of 
young adults.  I use inverse probability weighting (IPW) method to correct for potential biases 
from sample attrition (Wooldridge, 2001).  This procedure only requires the data that I have and 
differ from the traditional Heckman solution which require an instrumental variable that will be 
observable for the entire sample.  The Heckman solution may not be feasible because it is 
difficult to find an instrumental variable that is observable throughout the entire sample (Mu, 
2003). 
There are two stages that are required in order to employ the IPW procedure.  In the first 
stage, at t (t=2005, 2006), an attrition probit model is estimated with young adults still in the 
sample at t-1
14
.  Given this sample, some young adults are lost to attrition at time t, and some are 
not.  Thus, the conditional probit model is estimated as follow: 
                                                                                                              (4) 
where     is the probability that young adult i stay in survey s at time t=2005, 2006 and the error 
term is normally distributed as                     . 
                                                             





However, since the sample may not be representative of the population in the original sample in t-
1=2002, the IPW procedure cannot be used directly to mitigate the attrition bias associated with 
this sample.  Using the joint probabilities computed from these predicted conditional probabilities 
can provide consistent estimators when using IPW procedure (Wooldridge, 2002d).  In the second 
stage, these predicted conditional probabilities from equation (4) are used to compute the joint 
probabilities that young adult i stay in survey s at t=2005, 2006.  Therefore, the joint probability 
is computed as follow:                                                            
                                         .  Hence, each young adult i at time t is 
assigned a weight     
 
    
. 
 Table 3 presents the probit estimates of the conditional probabilities of young adults 
being in the survey in 2005 and 2006 (see Appendix).  Conditional on household pension 
recipients, household size, young adults’ demographic characteristics, and young adults’ response 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics in 2002 by Attrition: Mean (Standard Deviation)
Stayers Leavers (1)-(2)
Variables (1) (2) P-value
OAP 0.139 0.088 0.000
(0.346) (0.284)
Household size 5.969 5.095 0.000
(2.808) (2.656)
Young adults age 17.854 18.365 0.000
(2.515) (2.438)
Young adults gender 0.444 0.420 0.262
(0.497) (0.494)
Young adults completed Matric 0.103 0.124 0.125
(0.304) (0.330)
Attidude of respond 2.930 2.912 0.160
(0.262) (0.297)
Bahavior of respond 2.810 2.800 0.609
(0.421) (0.441)
Observations 1201 939
Notes: Stayers are young adults who stayed in all 3 waves since 2002 survey.  Leavers are young adults 
who were in 2002 survey but dropped out either in 2005 or 2006 survey.  P-value tests the null hypothesis
that the variable mean is not different across the two samples.  Attitude=1 if young adult's response is
hostile; Attitude=2 if young adult's response is neither hostile nor friendly; Attitude=3 if young adult's
response is friendly.  Bahavior=1 if young adult's response is not at all attentive; Bahavior=2 if young adult's




to the survey, I found that OAP, household size, young adults age, gender, and attitude during the 
survey are statistically significant at 1% and 5% significance levels in explaining probabilities of 
being in the survey.  For example, young adults who are living with a pension recipient in 2002 
are likely to stay in the survey in 2005.  Also, young adults who attitude was not hostile but 
friendly in 2002 are most likely to remain in the survey in 2005 and 2006.  Moreover, the larger 
households size in 2002 the more likely the household members to stay in the survey in 2005. 
II.5 Results 
The results from estimating equation (2) are presented in tables 4a, 5a, 6a, and 7a.  In table 4a, 
columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10 present the effect of any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts 
on sexual debut of young adult females and males without attrition correction.  In contrast, 
columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12 present the effect of any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts 
on sexual debut of young adult females and males with attrition correction.  Tables 5a, 6a, and 7a 
follow the same format as table 4a.  Also, tables 4b, 4c, 5b, 5c, 6b, 6c, 7b, and 7c present results 
from estimating equation (3) using similar format as table 4a-7a as part of the internal validity of 
RDD controlling for baseline covariates such as household characteristics and assets as a 
robustness check as well as a way to reduce sampling variability in the estimator.  In addition, I 
restricted the sample of sexual debut of young adults to aged 14-18 because most of the young 
adults ages 19 and older had sexually debuted and as such they add little variation in the sample.  
However, I included aged 14-26 in the sample for the condom use, number of multiple partners, 
and marital status outcomes.  
 In table 4a, results indicate that any OAP receipts reduce the probability of young adult 
females sexual debut by 14.8% and it is significant at the 5% level without attrition correction; 
however, this result is insignificant after attrition correction.  OAPFemale receipts reduce the 




correction at the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively.  Also, OAPMale receipts reduce 
the probability of young adult males sexual debut by 20.0% after correcting for attrition at the 
10% significance level.   
 In table 4b, I show that the estimates shown in table 4a are robust to the inclusion of 
additional controls.  Any OAP receipts reduce the probability of young adult females sexual 
debut by 16.8% and 13.6% without and with attrition correction at 5% and 10% significance 
levels, respectively.  The effect is larger when pension recipient is female.  OAPFemale receipts 
reduce the probability of young adult females sexual debut by 18.5% and 16.1% without and with 
attrition correction at 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively.  On the contrary, a male 
receiving the pension has no significant effect on the probability of young adults starting sex 
(columns 9 to 12). 
 Tables 5a and 5b results show that OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts did not 
have any significant impact on the number of multiple partners reported by young adults (females 
and males).  Also, tables 6a and 6b results indicate that OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale 
receipts did not have any significant impact on self-reported condom use by young adults 
(females and males).  
 I use marital status (married or not married) in my analyses as one indicator of sexual 
activities.  This is important because early marriage is perceived as protective strategy by parents 
against pre-marital pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections (Bracher et al., 2003; Clark, 
2004).  Clark (2004) show that in Kenya and Zambia, early marriage reduces condom use, 
increase coital frequency, and prevents girls’ ability to abstain from sex.  Also, early marriage 
exposures girls to HIV/AIDS because husbands of married girls are 3 times more likely to be 
HIV-positive compared to boyfriends of single girls.   
 Table 7a results indicate that any OAP receipts reduce the probability that young adult 
males get married by 19.0% and 17.5% at 1% and 5% significance levels without and with 




that case, OAPFemale receipts reduce the probability that young adult males get married by 
28.2% and 26.9% at the 1% significance level without and with attrition correction, respectively.  
In contrast, OAPMale receipts increase the probability that young adult females get married by 
23.3% and 22.7% without and with attrition correction, respectively.  Likewise, OAPMale 
receipts increase the probability that young adult males get married by 25.3% and 24.3% without 
and with attrition correction, respectively.    
 Table 7b shows that the estimates shown in table 7a are robust to the inclusion of 
additional controls.  Results indicate that any OAP receipts reduce the probability that young 
adult males get married by 16.8% and 15.3% at 5% significance level without and with attrition 
correction, respectively.  OAPFemale receipts reduce the probability that young adult males get 
married by 24.0% and 22.9% at the 1% significance level without and with attrition correction, 
respectively.  Also, OAPFemale receipts reduce the probability that young adult females get 
married by 10.2% and 9.2% at the 10% significance level without and with attrition correction, 
respectively.  In contrast, OAPMale receipts increase the probability that young adult females get 
married by 20.7% and 19.5% without and with attrition correction at 5% significance level, 
respectively.  Likewise, OAPMale receipts increase the probability that young adult males get 
married by 24.0% and 23.6% without and with attrition correction at 1% significance level, 
respectively.    
 Income is a main determinant of sexual behavior.  Education is, however, endogenous for 
the age group that I considered.  Moreover, receiving OAP influences education decisions as 
well.  I show in tables 4c, 5c, 6c, and 7c that controlling for education does not change the main 
conclusion of the paper.  Results in tables 4c, 5c, 6c, and 7c re-estimated equation (3) by 
including educational level completed by young adults.  
 In table 4c, results indicate that any OAP receipts reduce the probability of young adult 
females sexual debut by 18.1% and 15.1% without and with attrition correction at the 5% and 




females sexual debut by 19.1% and 16.9% without and with attrition correction at the 1% and 5% 
significance levels, respectively.   
 Tables 5c results shows that any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts did not have 
any significant impact on the number of multiple partners reported by young adults (females and 
males).  Also, table 6c results indicate that any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts did not 
have any significant impact on self-reported condom use by young adults (females and males).  
 In table 7c, results indicate that any OAP receipts reduce the probability that young adult 
males get married by 16.4% and 15.0% without and with attrition correction, and both estimates 
are significant at the 5% level.  OAPFemale receipts reduce the probability that young adult 
males get married by 23.6% and 22.5% at the 1% significance level without and with attrition 
correction, respectively.  Also, OAPFemale receipts reduce the probability that young adult 
females get married by 10.0% and 9.0% at the 10% significance level without and with attrition 
correction, respectively.  In contrast, OAPMale receipts increase the probability of young adult 
female get married by 20.6% and 19.5% without and with attrition correction, respectively. 
Likewise, OAPMale receipts does increase the probability of young adult male get married by 
24.0% and 23.5% without and with attrition correction, and both estimates are significant at the 
1% significance level. 
II.6 Conclusion 
This paper presents evidence of the impact any OAP, OAPFemale, and OAPMale receipts on 
sexual behavior of young adult males and females aged 14-26.  Using RDD identification 
strategy, I find that young adult females who live with OAPFemale recipients become sexually 
active later 15.3% on average.  There were no significant impact of any OAP, OAPFemale, and 
OAPMale receipts on self-reported condom use and number of multiple partners of young adults.  
Young adult females and males who live with OAPFemale recipients reduce their probability of 




females and males who live with OAPMale recipients increase their probability of getting 
married by 21.4% and 23.8% on average, respectively.   
These results answer my earlier research questions:  Does OAP impact sexual behavior of 
African young adults?  Does the effect of OAP differ by gender of the pension recipients?  Does 
the effect of OAP differ by gender of the African young adults?”  The answer is yes, OAP 
significantly impact sexual behavior of African young adults.  Also, the effects of OAP differ by 
gender of the recipient as evidence provided by these results.   
These results illustrates that even though OAP is targeted toward the elderly in South 
Africa as a way to alleviate poverty and improve their living standard, it has secondary effects on 
other household members.  In particular, these results are important because it suggests that OAP 
can improve African young adults transition into adulthood in time when HIV/AIDS infection 
rate is high. 
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Table 3: Attrition Probability during 2002-2006
Dependent Variable: Stay=1; Leave=0
Variables (2005|2002) (2006|2005, 2002)
OAP 0.273** -1.498
(0.106) (0.130)
Household size 0.066*** 0.007
(0.014) (0.016)
Young adults age -0.038*** -0.012
(0.013) (0.017)
Young adults gender 0.151*** -0.222**
(0.056) (0.088)













Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Wave 1 =2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.
Attitude=1 if young adult's response is hostile; Attitude=2 if young adult's response is neither
hostile nor friendly; Attitude=3 if young adult's response is friendly. Bahavior=1 if young adult's
response is not at all attentive; Bahavior=2 if young adult's response is somewhat attentive; 








Table 4a: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Sexual Debut of Young Adults Aged 14-18
Dependent Variable: Young Adults Ever had Sex
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP -0.148** -0.110 -0.115 -0.113
(0.070) (0.093) (0.072) (0.093)
OAPFemale -0.155*** -0.079 -0.130** -0.084
(0.058) (0.089) (0.060) (0.088)
OAPMale -0.055 -0.192 -0.036 -0.200*
(0.115) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119)
Maxage -0.044 -0.004 -0.046 -0.009 -0.043 -0.001 -0.045 -0.007 -0.034 0.001 -0.039 -0.005
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Maxage^2 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Maxage^3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.065 0.025 0.064 0.017 0.067 0.026 0.066 0.018 0.061 0.024 0.061 0.017
(0.064) (0.056) (0.066) (0.055) (0.063) (0.056) (0.065) (0.056) (0.063) (0.056) (0.065) (0.056)
Wave_4 0.269*** 0.291*** 0.254*** 0.279*** 0.274*** 0.291*** 0.258*** 0.279*** 0.266*** 0.297*** 0.252*** 0.285***
(0.051) (0.046) (0.052) (0.047) (0.051) (0.046) (0.053) (0.047) (0.050) (0.046) (0.052) (0.048)
Constant 1.296*** 0.573 1.338*** 0.653 1.277*** 0.530 1.334*** 0.618 1.142*** 0.493 1.239*** 0.587
(0.408) (0.441) (0.417) (0.452) (0.411) (0.438) (0.417) (0.447) (0.411) (0.443) (0.417) (0.450)
Observations 797 650 797 650 797 650 797 650 797 650 797 650
R-squared 0.040 0.049 0.036 0.045 0.041 0.048 0.037 0.044 0.035 0.051 0.033 0.046
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Young adults ever had sex (females or males) equal 1 if young adults reported ever having had sex, 
and 0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household
member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member,
Maxage^2 is age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Parameter estimates are





Table 4b: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Sexual Debut of Young Adults Aged 14-18 Controlling for Baseline Covariates
Dependent Variable: Young Adults Ever had Sex
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP -0.168** -0.069 -0.136* -0.069
(0.075) (0.100) (0.075) (0.099)
OAPFemale -0.185*** -0.063 -0.161** -0.064
(0.064) (0.097) (0.065) (0.097)
OAPMale -0.049 -0.140 -0.026 -0.150
(0.106) (0.120) (0.110) (0.120)
Maxage -0.042 0.000 -0.042 -0.003 -0.041 0.001 -0.043 -0.002 -0.029 0.004 -0.034 0.000
(0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)
Maxage^2 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Maxage^3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 -0.043 -0.058 -0.044 -0.066 -0.041 -0.057 -0.042 -0.065 -0.047 -0.058 -0.046 -0.065
(0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Wave_4 0.104* 0.163*** 0.087 0.146** 0.108* 0.163*** 0.091 0.146** 0.103* 0.165*** 0.086 0.149**
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
Age_15 0.160** 0.092 0.171*** 0.092 0.161** 0.093 0.172*** 0.092 0.158** 0.091 0.169*** 0.090
(0.062) (0.074) (0.063) (0.074) (0.062) (0.074) (0.063) (0.074) (0.062) (0.074) (0.063) (0.074)
Age_16 0.226*** 0.232*** 0.231*** 0.230*** 0.224*** 0.233*** 0.230*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.232*** 0.235*** 0.229***
(0.060) (0.072) (0.060) (0.073) (0.060) (0.071) (0.060) (0.072) (0.061) (0.072) (0.060) (0.073)
Age_17 0.282*** 0.185*** 0.293*** 0.188*** 0.280*** 0.185*** 0.291*** 0.187*** 0.284*** 0.186*** 0.294*** 0.189***
(0.061) (0.065) (0.062) (0.066) (0.062) (0.065) (0.062) (0.066) (0.062) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066)
Age_18 0.433*** 0.331*** 0.446*** 0.341*** 0.433*** 0.331*** 0.446*** 0.342*** 0.434*** 0.334*** 0.446*** 0.344***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.059) (0.061) (0.060)
Household size 0.012 0.021** 0.014* 0.023** 0.013* 0.021** 0.015* 0.023** 0.011 0.019* 0.013 0.022**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Children under 5 years old -0.001 -0.010 0.003 -0.009 -0.002 -0.011 0.002 -0.010 -0.002 -0.010 0.003 -0.009
(0.023) (0.034) (0.024) (0.034) (0.023) (0.034) (0.024) (0.034) (0.023) (0.034) (0.024) (0.034)
Household head educated 0.006 -0.003 0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Marital status 0.027* -0.002 0.026* -0.001 0.028** -0.002 0.027** -0.001 0.021 -0.004 0.022* -0.003
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
Owning home 0.023 0.058 0.028 0.052 0.028 0.060 0.031 0.054 0.019 0.055 0.025 0.049
(0.051) (0.060) (0.052) (0.060) (0.051) (0.059) (0.051) (0.060) (0.051) (0.060) (0.052) (0.061)
Life insurance -0.077 0.011 -0.075 0.008 -0.076 0.010 -0.074 0.007 -0.078* 0.011 -0.076 0.008
(0.047) (0.058) (0.047) (0.058) (0.047) (0.058) (0.047) (0.058) (0.047) (0.058) (0.047) (0.058)
Washing machine -0.055 0.005 -0.059 0.002 -0.056 0.006 -0.060 0.003 -0.059 0.000 -0.062 -0.002
(0.061) (0.059) (0.062) (0.060) (0.061) (0.059) (0.062) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.062) (0.061)
Constant 0.830** 0.257 0.831** 0.301 0.818** 0.238 0.832** 0.286 0.665* 0.215 0.717* 0.269
(0.393) (0.438) (0.402) (0.447) (0.389) (0.437) (0.398) (0.445) (0.388) (0.444) (0.398) (0.449)
Observations 797 650 797 650 797 650 797 650 797 650 797 650
R-squared 0.116 0.107 0.116 0.105 0.118 0.107 0.118 0.105 0.110 0.108 0.112 0.106
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas. Young adults ever had sex (females or males) equal 1 if young adults reported ever having had sex, and 
0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household member 
is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member , Maxage^2 is 
age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline covariates: young adults age dummies,
household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, and Marital status of household member), and household assets (Household ownership of home,






Table 4c: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Sexual Debut of Young Adults Aged 14-18 Controlling for Educational Attainment
Dependent Variable: Young Adults Ever had Sex
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP -0.181** -0.064 -0.151* -0.064
(0.076) (0.100) (0.077) (0.099)
OAPFemale -0.191*** -0.057 -0.169** -0.058
(0.064) (0.098) (0.066) (0.098)
OAPMale -0.031 -0.146 -0.011 -0.156
(0.102) (0.122) (0.107) (0.122)
Maxage -0.041 -0.002 -0.042 -0.006 -0.040 -0.001 -0.042 -0.006 -0.027 0.001 -0.032 -0.004
(0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031)
Maxage^2 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Maxage^3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.079 0.042 0.097 0.052 0.064 0.040 0.087 0.050 0.030 0.046 0.059 0.056
(0.140) (0.097) (0.141) (0.097) (0.137) (0.098) (0.138) (0.098) (0.147) (0.098) (0.146) (0.097)
Wave_4 0.114** 0.176*** 0.096 0.158*** 0.118** 0.176*** 0.099* 0.158*** 0.112** 0.179*** 0.095 0.161***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
Age_15 0.161** 0.092 0.172*** 0.092 0.162** 0.092 0.172*** 0.093 0.159** 0.090 0.170*** 0.090
(0.062) (0.075) (0.063) (0.075) (0.063) (0.075) (0.063) (0.075) (0.062) (0.075) (0.063) (0.075)
Age_16 0.227*** 0.233*** 0.232*** 0.231*** 0.225*** 0.234*** 0.230*** 0.232*** 0.232*** 0.233*** 0.236*** 0.231***
(0.060) (0.073) (0.060) (0.074) (0.060) (0.072) (0.060) (0.073) (0.061) (0.073) (0.060) (0.074)
Age_17 0.285*** 0.192*** 0.296*** 0.195*** 0.282*** 0.191*** 0.294*** 0.194*** 0.286*** 0.193*** 0.297*** 0.196***
(0.061) (0.066) (0.062) (0.067) (0.062) (0.066) (0.063) (0.067) (0.062) (0.066) (0.063) (0.067)
Age_18 0.439*** 0.340*** 0.451*** 0.352*** 0.437*** 0.341*** 0.450*** 0.352*** 0.439*** 0.343*** 0.451*** 0.355***
(0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Household size 0.013 0.020* 0.015* 0.023** 0.014* 0.021** 0.015* 0.023** 0.012 0.019* 0.014 0.021**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Children under 5 years old -0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.004
(0.023) (0.033) (0.024) (0.034) (0.023) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.023) (0.034) (0.024) (0.034)
Less_than_Matric 0.008 -0.002 0.008 -0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.008 -0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.007 -0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Matric -0.652*** 0.107 -0.614** 0.152 -0.648*** 0.106 -0.606** 0.150 -0.667** 0.116 -0.633** 0.159
(0.236) (0.183) (0.240) (0.199) (0.235) (0.184) (0.238) (0.200) (0.267) (0.181) (0.270) (0.197)
 More_than_Matric -0.690*** -0.099 -0.653*** -0.066 -0.675*** -0.101 -0.636*** -0.068 -0.706*** -0.096 -0.671*** -0.064
(0.184) (0.150) (0.189) (0.169) (0.183) (0.151) (0.186) (0.169) (0.212) (0.148) (0.213) (0.166)
Household head edcuated -0.803*** 0.008 -0.789*** 0.031 -0.780*** 0.009 -0.767*** 0.033 -0.760*** 0.013 -0.762*** 0.034
(0.135) (0.158) (0.142) (0.173) (0.133) (0.158) (0.139) (0.173) (0.155) (0.157) (0.162) (0.172)
Marital status 0.026* -0.003 0.025* -0.002 0.028** -0.003 0.027* -0.002 0.021 -0.005 0.021 -0.004
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
Owning home 0.021 0.056 0.026 0.050 0.026 0.058 0.030 0.051 0.018 0.053 0.024 0.047
(0.051) (0.061) (0.051) (0.062) (0.051) (0.061) (0.051) (0.062) (0.051) (0.061) (0.051) (0.062)
Life insurance -0.075 0.006 -0.072 0.002 -0.074 0.004 -0.071 0.001 -0.077 0.006 -0.074 0.002
(0.048) (0.058) (0.048) (0.058) (0.048) (0.058) (0.048) (0.058) (0.047) (0.058) (0.047) (0.058)
Washing machine -0.059 0.004 -0.063 0.002 -0.061 0.005 -0.064 0.003 -0.062 -0.001 -0.065 -0.002
(0.063) (0.061) (0.064) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) (0.064) (0.061) (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062)
Constant 1.466*** 0.184 1.436*** 0.192 1.441*** 0.168 1.421*** 0.179 1.296*** 0.141 1.325*** 0.158
(0.453) (0.466) (0.464) (0.485) (0.452) (0.466) (0.463) (0.483) (0.462) (0.470) (0.474) (0.485)
Observations 797 650 797 650 797 650 797 650 797 650 797 650
R-squared 0.120 0.113 0.120 0.111 0.122 0.112 0.121 0.111 0.113 0.114 0.116 0.113
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Young adults ever had sex (females or males) equal 1 if young adults reported ever having had sex, and  
0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household member 
is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member , Maxage^2 is 
age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline covariates: young adults age dummies,
young adults educational attainment  (Less_than_Matric, Matric, and More_than_Matric), (household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, and 
Marital status of household member), and household assets (Household ownership of home, Life insurance, and Washing machine).   Parameter estimates are statistically different from zero at *** 1%, 






Table 5a: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Multiple Partnerships of Young Adults Aged 14-26
Dependent Variable: Young Adults having Multiple Partners in the Past 12 Months
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP 0.031 -0.054 0.034 -0.054
(0.037) (0.061) (0.039) (0.063)
OAPFemale 0.028 -0.062 0.027 -0.058
(0.042) (0.064) (0.044) (0.065)
OAPMale 0.070 -0.036 0.079 -0.036
(0.068) (0.063) (0.072) (0.065)
Maxage 0.001 -0.012 0.002 -0.012 0.000 -0.011 0.001 -0.011 -0.000 -0.009 0.001 -0.009
(0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.018)
Maxage^2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 -0.089*** -0.147*** -0.089*** -0.153*** -0.088*** -0.147*** -0.089*** -0.153*** -0.089*** -0.147*** -0.089*** -0.154***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029)
Wave_4 -0.054** -0.022 -0.054** -0.028 -0.054** -0.022 -0.054** -0.028 -0.054** -0.021 -0.054** -0.027
(0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029)
Constant 0.228 0.594** 0.221 0.583** 0.241 0.584** 0.236 0.571** 0.246 0.550** 0.237 0.547**
(0.198) (0.262) (0.197) (0.269) (0.201) (0.254) (0.200) (0.263) (0.199) (0.249) (0.197) (0.260)
Observations 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434
R-squared 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.017 0.011 0.017 0.013 0.016 0.012 0.017
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas. Young adults having multiple partners (females or males) equal 1 if young adults reported having    
more than one sex partner in the last 12 months, and 0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale
is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, 
and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member, Maxage^2 is age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, 






Table 5b:  Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Multiple Partnerships of Young Adults Aged 14-26 Controlling for Baseline Covariates
Dependent Variable: Young Adults having Multiple Partners in the Past 12 Months
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP 0.041 -0.040 0.047 -0.038
(0.036) (0.063) (0.038) (0.065)
OAPFemale 0.033 -0.046 0.034 -0.041
(0.041) (0.065) (0.043) (0.067)
OAPMale 0.078 -0.025 0.088 -0.026
(0.067) (0.063) (0.071) (0.066)
Maxage 0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018)
Maxage^2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 -0.081*** -0.170*** -0.077*** -0.173*** -0.081*** -0.170*** -0.077*** -0.174*** -0.083*** -0.171*** -0.078*** -0.174***
(0.026) (0.035) (0.027) (0.035) (0.026) (0.035) (0.027) (0.035) (0.026) (0.035) (0.027) (0.035)
Wave_4 -0.049* -0.049 -0.048 -0.051 -0.049* -0.049 -0.048 -0.051 -0.050* -0.047 -0.048* -0.050
(0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.036)
Age_15 -0.048 0.012 -0.038 0.005 -0.046 0.011 -0.036 0.005 -0.048 0.012 -0.038 0.005
(0.112) (0.105) (0.113) (0.107) (0.113) (0.105) (0.113) (0.107) (0.112) (0.105) (0.113) (0.108)
Age_16 -0.061 0.096 -0.062 0.101 -0.060 0.095 -0.060 0.100 -0.063 0.097 -0.064 0.101
(0.102) (0.099) (0.102) (0.100) (0.102) (0.099) (0.103) (0.100) (0.101) (0.099) (0.102) (0.100)
Age_17 -0.113 0.126 -0.101 0.122 -0.111 0.124 -0.099 0.121 -0.113 0.126 -0.101 0.122
(0.094) (0.089) (0.095) (0.092) (0.095) (0.089) (0.096) (0.092) (0.094) (0.089) (0.095) (0.092)
Age_18 -0.099 0.217*** -0.096 0.205*** -0.098 0.216*** -0.096 0.205*** -0.098 0.217*** -0.095 0.205***
(0.096) (0.076) (0.097) (0.078) (0.096) (0.077) (0.097) (0.078) (0.096) (0.077) (0.097) (0.078)
Age_19 -0.073 0.204*** -0.068 0.200** -0.072 0.204*** -0.066 0.200** -0.072 0.205*** -0.067 0.201**
(0.099) (0.077) (0.100) (0.078) (0.100) (0.077) (0.100) (0.078) (0.099) (0.077) (0.100) (0.078)
Age_20 -0.094 0.152* -0.098 0.141* -0.093 0.150* -0.097 0.139* -0.094 0.154* -0.098 0.142*
(0.090) (0.078) (0.091) (0.079) (0.091) (0.078) (0.091) (0.079) (0.090) (0.079) (0.091) (0.080)
Age_21 -0.079 0.173** -0.067 0.179** -0.078 0.173** -0.066 0.179** -0.079 0.174** -0.067 0.180**
(0.097) (0.085) (0.098) (0.088) (0.098) (0.085) (0.098) (0.088) (0.097) (0.085) (0.097) (0.088)
Age_22 -0.069 0.194** -0.062 0.192** -0.068 0.193** -0.061 0.191** -0.070 0.195** -0.063 0.193**
(0.099) (0.077) (0.100) (0.080) (0.099) (0.077) (0.100) (0.080) (0.098) (0.077) (0.099) (0.080)
Age_23 -0.059 0.228** -0.058 0.225** -0.060 0.227** -0.058 0.225** -0.058 0.229** -0.056 0.227**
(0.104) (0.095) (0.107) (0.095) (0.104) (0.095) (0.107) (0.095) (0.104) (0.095) (0.107) (0.095)
Age_24 -0.084 0.187* -0.087 0.200** -0.083 0.187* -0.085 0.200** -0.084 0.188* -0.087 0.201**
(0.098) (0.099) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.099) (0.098) (0.099) (0.100) (0.099)
Age_25 -0.181* 0.062 -0.185* 0.057 -0.179* 0.060 -0.183* 0.056 -0.181* 0.062 -0.185* 0.057
(0.098) (0.089) (0.098) (0.091) (0.099) (0.089) (0.099) (0.091) (0.098) (0.090) (0.098) (0.091)
Age_26 -0.097 0.108 -0.094 0.101 -0.096 0.108 -0.093 0.101 -0.097 0.108 -0.095 0.100
(0.106) (0.100) (0.106) (0.101) (0.106) (0.100) (0.107) (0.101) (0.105) (0.100) (0.105) (0.101)
Household Size 0.008* -0.005 0.008** -0.005 0.008* -0.004 0.008** -0.005 0.008** -0.005 0.009** -0.005
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Children under 5 years old -0.015 -0.036* -0.020* -0.033 -0.015 -0.036* -0.020 -0.033 -0.016 -0.035* -0.021* -0.033
(0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.022) (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.021)
Household head educated -0.013*** 0.001 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.001 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.001 -0.013*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Marital Status -0.012 -0.001 -0.015* -0.002 -0.012 -0.001 -0.015* -0.002 -0.011 -0.002 -0.013 -0.002
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Owning Home -0.016 -0.011 -0.003 -0.010 -0.016 -0.010 -0.003 -0.010 -0.014 -0.012 -0.001 -0.011
(0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.046)
Life Insurance 0.001 -0.050 -0.007 -0.056* 0.000 -0.049 -0.007 -0.055* 0.001 -0.049 -0.006 -0.055
(0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.033)
Washing Machine 0.031 0.059 0.018 0.050 0.032 0.059 0.019 0.050 0.033 0.058 0.019 0.049
(0.029) (0.049) (0.028) (0.048) (0.029) (0.049) (0.028) (0.049) (0.029) (0.049) (0.027) (0.048)
Constant 0.466** 0.355 0.456** 0.324 0.485** 0.347 0.478** 0.315 0.488** 0.323 0.479** 0.299
(0.229) (0.270) (0.229) (0.278) (0.229) (0.260) (0.229) (0.271) (0.227) (0.255) (0.227) (0.267)
Observations 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434
R-squared 0.027 0.038 0.028 0.039 0.027 0.039 0.028 0.039 0.028 0.038 0.029 0.039
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas. Young adults having multiple partners (females or males) equal 1 if young adults reported more than one sex    
partner in the past 12 months, and 0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1
if only female household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest  
household member, Maxage^2 is age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline 
covariates: young adults age dummies, (household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, and Marital status of household member), and  household






Table 5c:  Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Multiple Partnerships of Young Adults Aged 14-26 Controlling for Educational Attainment
Dependent Variable: Young Adults having Multiple Partners in the Past 12 Months
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP 0.039 -0.041 0.044 -0.039
(0.036) (0.063) (0.038) (0.065)
OAPFemale 0.032 -0.044 0.033 -0.039
(0.041) (0.065) (0.043) (0.067)
OAPMale 0.077 -0.029 0.087 -0.030
(0.067) (0.061) (0.070) (0.064)
Maxage 0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018)
Maxage^2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 -0.085** -0.192*** -0.068* -0.188*** -0.084** -0.192*** -0.068* -0.188*** -0.085** -0.192*** -0.069* -0.188***
(0.035) (0.047) (0.036) (0.048) (0.035) (0.047) (0.036) (0.048) (0.035) (0.047) (0.036) (0.048)
Wave_4 -0.046 -0.041 -0.044 -0.043 -0.046 -0.042 -0.044 -0.043 -0.046 -0.040 -0.045 -0.042
(0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.036) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.036) (0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.037)
Age_15 -0.047 0.012 -0.037 0.006 -0.045 0.012 -0.035 0.005 -0.047 0.012 -0.037 0.006
(0.112) (0.105) (0.113) (0.108) (0.113) (0.105) (0.113) (0.107) (0.112) (0.105) (0.113) (0.108)
Age_16 -0.059 0.097 -0.059 0.102 -0.058 0.097 -0.058 0.101 -0.061 0.098 -0.061 0.103
(0.102) (0.098) (0.103) (0.099) (0.102) (0.098) (0.103) (0.100) (0.101) (0.098) (0.102) (0.100)
Age_17 -0.109 0.128 -0.096 0.125 -0.108 0.127 -0.094 0.124 -0.110 0.128 -0.096 0.125
(0.094) (0.090) (0.096) (0.092) (0.095) (0.089) (0.096) (0.092) (0.094) (0.089) (0.096) (0.092)
Age_18 -0.095 0.217*** -0.091 0.205*** -0.094 0.216*** -0.090 0.205** -0.094 0.217*** -0.090 0.206***
(0.097) (0.077) (0.097) (0.078) (0.097) (0.077) (0.098) (0.078) (0.097) (0.077) (0.098) (0.079)
Age_19 -0.066 0.207*** -0.060 0.205*** -0.065 0.207*** -0.059 0.205*** -0.066 0.208*** -0.060 0.205***
(0.100) (0.077) (0.100) (0.078) (0.100) (0.077) (0.100) (0.078) (0.100) (0.077) (0.100) (0.078)
Age_20 -0.086 0.160** -0.087 0.150* -0.085 0.158** -0.086 0.148* -0.086 0.162** -0.087 0.151*
(0.092) (0.078) (0.093) (0.079) (0.092) (0.078) (0.093) (0.079) (0.091) (0.079) (0.092) (0.080)
Age_21 -0.071 0.181** -0.056 0.189** -0.070 0.181** -0.055 0.189** -0.071 0.182** -0.056 0.190**
(0.098) (0.085) (0.099) (0.087) (0.099) (0.085) (0.099) (0.087) (0.098) (0.085) (0.098) (0.087)
Age_22 -0.058 0.200*** -0.049 0.201** -0.057 0.200*** -0.048 0.201** -0.059 0.202*** -0.050 0.202**
(0.100) (0.076) (0.101) (0.079) (0.100) (0.076) (0.101) (0.079) (0.099) (0.076) (0.101) (0.079)
Age_23 -0.050 0.239** -0.046 0.239** -0.050 0.238** -0.046 0.239** -0.048 0.241** -0.044 0.240**
(0.106) (0.096) (0.108) (0.095) (0.105) (0.096) (0.108) (0.095) (0.105) (0.096) (0.108) (0.095)
Age_24 -0.072 0.193* -0.073 0.208** -0.071 0.193* -0.072 0.208** -0.072 0.195* -0.073 0.209**
(0.099) (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.100)
Age_25 -0.171* 0.075 -0.174* 0.072 -0.169* 0.073 -0.172* 0.071 -0.171* 0.075 -0.174* 0.073
(0.099) (0.088) (0.099) (0.089) (0.099) (0.088) (0.100) (0.089) (0.098) (0.088) (0.099) (0.089)
Age_26 -0.087 0.115 -0.085 0.110 -0.086 0.115 -0.083 0.110 -0.088 0.115 -0.086 0.110
(0.106) (0.099) (0.107) (0.100) (0.107) (0.099) (0.107) (0.100) (0.106) (0.099) (0.106) (0.100)
Household size 0.008* -0.005 0.008** -0.005 0.007* -0.004 0.008** -0.005 0.008** -0.005 0.009** -0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Children under 5 years old -0.015 -0.035* -0.021* -0.033 -0.015 -0.035* -0.021* -0.033 -0.016 -0.035* -0.022* -0.033
(0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.021)
 Less_than_Matric 0.014 -0.048 0.041 -0.024 0.013 -0.047 0.040 -0.023 0.015 -0.047 0.041 -0.023
(0.075) (0.104) (0.075) (0.106) (0.075) (0.104) (0.076) (0.106) (0.075) (0.105) (0.074) (0.106)
 Matric -0.020 -0.092 0.002 -0.080 -0.021 -0.090 0.001 -0.079 -0.020 -0.091 0.002 -0.079
(0.072) (0.091) (0.072) (0.092) (0.073) (0.091) (0.072) (0.093) (0.072) (0.091) (0.071) (0.093)
More_than_Matric 0.018 -0.010 0.026 0.003 0.017 -0.009 0.025 0.004 0.017 -0.009 0.025 0.004
(0.063) (0.087) (0.064) (0.089) (0.063) (0.087) (0.064) (0.089) (0.062) (0.088) (0.062) (0.089)
Household head educated -0.012*** 0.001 -0.013*** 0.003 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.003 -0.012*** 0.001 -0.012*** 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Marital status -0.012 -0.001 -0.014* -0.001 -0.012 -0.000 -0.014* -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -0.013 -0.002
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Owning home -0.015 -0.012 -0.001 -0.012 -0.015 -0.012 -0.002 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 0.000 -0.014
(0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.046)
Life insurance -0.000 -0.050 -0.006 -0.056* -0.000 -0.050 -0.007 -0.055* 0.000 -0.050 -0.005 -0.055
(0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.033)
Washing machine 0.033 0.055 0.020 0.046 0.034 0.055 0.021 0.046 0.035 0.053 0.022 0.045
(0.029) (0.049) (0.028) (0.049) (0.029) (0.050) (0.028) (0.049) (0.029) (0.049) (0.027) (0.049)
Constant 0.442* 0.398 0.404 0.343 0.460* 0.387 0.423* 0.331 0.462* 0.365 0.425* 0.317
(0.244) (0.284) (0.244) (0.291) (0.240) (0.274) (0.241) (0.284) (0.241) (0.272) (0.242) (0.282)
Observations 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434 1,873 1,434
R-squared 0.029 0.041 0.030 0.042 0.029 0.041 0.029 0.042 0.029 0.040 0.030 0.042
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas. Young adults having multiple partners (females or males) equal 1 if young adults reported more than one   
sex partner in the last 12 months, and 0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 
if only female household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest
household member, Maxage^2 is  age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline covariates: 
young adults age dummies, young adults educational attainment  (Less_than_Matric, Matric, and More_than_Matric), (household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household
head educated, and Marital status of household member), and household assets  (Household ownership of home, Life insurance, and Washing machine).   Parameter estimates are statistically different






Table6a: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Condom Usage by Young adults Aged 14-26 
Dependent Variable: Young Adults Reported Using Condom at Last Sex
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP -0.070 -0.032 -0.064 -0.041
(0.046) (0.054) (0.049) (0.055)
OAPFemale -0.042 -0.076 -0.045 -0.090
(0.046) (0.071) (0.049) (0.073)
OAPMale -0.051 -0.049 -0.046 -0.054
(0.068) (0.066) (0.071) (0.070)
Maxage -0.010 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.006 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.004
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019)
Maxage^2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.074** 0.066* 0.082** 0.064* 0.073** 0.066* 0.082** 0.065* 0.073** 0.066* 0.082** 0.065*
(0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038)
Wave_4 -0.114*** -0.076** -0.111*** -0.078** -0.114*** -0.077** -0.111*** -0.079** -0.114*** -0.074** -0.110*** -0.076**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032)
Constant 0.767*** 0.704** 0.720*** 0.703** 0.713*** 0.728*** 0.680*** 0.723*** 0.690*** 0.686** 0.656*** 0.680**
(0.253) (0.273) (0.261) (0.280) (0.252) (0.270) (0.258) (0.276) (0.236) (0.265) (0.245) (0.274)
Observations 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236
R-squared 0.031 0.020 0.032 0.020 0.031 0.021 0.031 0.022 0.030 0.020 0.031 0.020
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas. Young adults condom use (females or males) equal 1 if young adults reported using condom at last sex, and   
0 otherwise. OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receive OAP, and 0 otherwise. OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if onle female household 
member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise. OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise. Maxage is age of oldest  household member, 
Maxage^2 is age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Parameter estimates are






Table 6b:  Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Condom Usage by Young adults Aged 14-26 Controlling for Baseline Covariates
Dependent Variable: Young Adults Reported Using Condom at Last Sex
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP -0.080* -0.031 -0.074 -0.039
(0.046) (0.054) (0.048) (0.055)
OAPFemale -0.051 -0.080 -0.055 -0.093
(0.047) (0.072) (0.049) (0.073)
OAPMale -0.049 -0.038 -0.042 -0.042
(0.069) (0.072) (0.071) (0.076)
Maxage -0.013 0.005 -0.011 0.006 -0.009 0.003 -0.009 0.004 -0.007 0.006 -0.006 0.007
(0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019)
Maxage^2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.095** 0.097** 0.109** 0.091** 0.094** 0.096** 0.107** 0.091** 0.094** 0.097** 0.108** 0.092**
(0.042) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.041) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.042) (0.045)
Wave_4 -0.080** -0.046 -0.069* -0.054 -0.081** -0.048 -0.070* -0.056 -0.080** -0.044 -0.069* -0.051
(0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Age_15 0.112 0.199** 0.137 0.204** 0.108 0.200** 0.133 0.205** 0.115 0.199** 0.139 0.204**
(0.159) (0.097) (0.160) (0.100) (0.159) (0.098) (0.160) (0.101) (0.156) (0.097) (0.157) (0.100)
Age_16 -0.013 -0.054 0.005 -0.042 -0.016 -0.059 0.002 -0.047 -0.009 -0.051 0.008 -0.039
(0.165) (0.122) (0.170) (0.123) (0.166) (0.123) (0.171) (0.124) (0.162) (0.121) (0.167) (0.123)
Age_17 -0.031 -0.209* -0.017 -0.200* -0.035 -0.211* -0.021 -0.202* -0.030 -0.208* -0.016 -0.200*
(0.154) (0.116) (0.158) (0.120) (0.154) (0.117) (0.159) (0.121) (0.151) (0.115) (0.156) (0.120)
Age_18 -0.012 -0.126 -0.004 -0.115 -0.013 -0.127 -0.005 -0.116 -0.009 -0.125 -0.001 -0.115
(0.159) (0.117) (0.164) (0.119) (0.159) (0.117) (0.164) (0.119) (0.156) (0.116) (0.161) (0.118)
Age_19 0.025 -0.102 0.044 -0.086 0.023 -0.104 0.041 -0.088 0.028 -0.101 0.046 -0.086
(0.154) (0.117) (0.159) (0.120) (0.154) (0.117) (0.159) (0.120) (0.152) (0.116) (0.157) (0.119)
Age_20 -0.017 -0.162 -0.004 -0.152 -0.019 -0.165 -0.006 -0.155 -0.013 -0.159 -0.000 -0.150
(0.152) (0.114) (0.157) (0.117) (0.152) (0.115) (0.157) (0.118) (0.150) (0.114) (0.154) (0.117)
Age_21 -0.064 -0.123 -0.061 -0.112 -0.065 -0.126 -0.062 -0.113 -0.057 -0.122 -0.055 -0.111
(0.157) (0.112) (0.161) (0.115) (0.157) (0.112) (0.161) (0.115) (0.154) (0.111) (0.158) (0.115)
Age_22 -0.057 -0.113 -0.041 -0.098 -0.057 -0.115 -0.042 -0.100 -0.050 -0.111 -0.035 -0.096
(0.153) (0.121) (0.157) (0.124) (0.153) (0.121) (0.157) (0.125) (0.150) (0.120) (0.155) (0.124)
Age_23 -0.079 -0.121 -0.077 -0.112 -0.079 -0.124 -0.077 -0.115 -0.074 -0.120 -0.073 -0.112
(0.159) (0.111) (0.162) (0.115) (0.158) (0.112) (0.162) (0.115) (0.156) (0.111) (0.160) (0.115)
Age_24 -0.003 -0.120 0.002 -0.118 -0.005 -0.122 0.000 -0.119 0.000 -0.118 0.005 -0.117
(0.157) (0.114) (0.159) (0.118) (0.157) (0.114) (0.160) (0.118) (0.154) (0.113) (0.157) (0.117)
Age_25 -0.092 -0.111 -0.110 -0.098 -0.094 -0.112 -0.112 -0.099 -0.087 -0.110 -0.105 -0.098
(0.168) (0.119) (0.173) (0.122) (0.169) (0.119) (0.174) (0.123) (0.166) (0.118) (0.171) (0.122)
Age_26 -0.121 -0.144 -0.114 -0.112 -0.123 -0.144 -0.116 -0.111 -0.118 -0.145 -0.111 -0.113
(0.162) (0.115) (0.167) (0.117) (0.163) (0.115) (0.167) (0.117) (0.161) (0.115) (0.165) (0.117)
Household size 0.004 -0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.005 -0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Children under 5 years old -0.019 -0.059*** -0.020 -0.063*** -0.020 -0.060*** -0.021 -0.064*** -0.020 -0.058*** -0.021 -0.062***
(0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.022)
Household head educated 0.008* 0.003 0.009** 0.003 0.008* 0.003 0.009** 0.003 0.008* 0.003 0.009** 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Owning home -0.018 0.013 -0.018 0.011 -0.018 0.014 -0.018 0.012 -0.021 0.012 -0.021 0.009
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043)
Life insurance -0.020 -0.012 -0.016 -0.014 -0.020 -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 -0.020 -0.012 -0.016 -0.014
(0.032) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030)
Washing machine 0.064** 0.039 0.061** 0.039 0.062** 0.041 0.060* 0.041 0.060** 0.036 0.057* 0.037
(0.030) (0.038) (0.031) (0.037) (0.030) (0.038) (0.031) (0.037) (0.029) (0.037) (0.030) (0.037)
Constant 0.761** 0.746** 0.695** 0.727** 0.704** 0.772** 0.654** 0.750** 0.665** 0.724** 0.613** 0.702**
(0.301) (0.313) (0.312) (0.323) (0.299) (0.309) (0.308) (0.318) (0.283) (0.307) (0.295) (0.318)
Observations 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236
R-squared 0.046 0.042 0.049 0.042 0.045 0.043 0.048 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.048 0.042
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas. Young adults condom use (females or males) equal 1 if young adults reported using condom at last sex, and  
0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household member
is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member,  
Maxage^2 is age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline covariates: young adults 
age dummies,  (household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, and Marital status of household member), and household assets  (Household ownership 






Table 6c: Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Condom Usage by Young adults Aged 14-26 Controlling for Educational Attainment
Dependent Variable: Young Adults Reported Using Condom at Last Sex
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP -0.077* -0.029 -0.071 -0.037
(0.046) (0.055) (0.048) (0.056)
OAPFemale -0.051 -0.078 -0.055 -0.091
(0.047) (0.072) (0.049) (0.074)
OAPMale -0.050 -0.035 -0.042 -0.040
(0.069) (0.073) (0.071) (0.077)
Maxage -0.011 0.007 -0.009 0.008 -0.007 0.005 -0.006 0.006 -0.005 0.008 -0.004 0.009
(0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019)
Maxage^2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.009 0.066 0.016 0.058 0.008 0.067 0.015 0.058 0.008 0.067 0.015 0.059
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.053)
Wave_4 -0.084** -0.054 -0.072* -0.062 -0.085** -0.056 -0.072* -0.064 -0.084** -0.052 -0.072* -0.059
(0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039)
Age_15 0.105 0.198** 0.129 0.203** 0.101 0.199** 0.125 0.204** 0.108 0.198** 0.132 0.203**
(0.158) (0.098) (0.158) (0.101) (0.158) (0.099) (0.159) (0.101) (0.155) (0.097) (0.155) (0.100)
Age_16 -0.021 -0.053 -0.004 -0.040 -0.024 -0.058 -0.007 -0.046 -0.017 -0.050 -0.001 -0.038
(0.164) (0.122) (0.168) (0.123) (0.164) (0.123) (0.168) (0.124) (0.160) (0.121) (0.165) (0.123)
Age_17 -0.049 -0.210* -0.036 -0.201* -0.053 -0.212* -0.040 -0.203* -0.048 -0.209* -0.035 -0.200*
(0.152) (0.117) (0.156) (0.121) (0.152) (0.117) (0.156) (0.121) (0.149) (0.116) (0.154) (0.120)
Age_18 -0.033 -0.125 -0.025 -0.115 -0.034 -0.126 -0.027 -0.115 -0.029 -0.124 -0.023 -0.114
(0.157) (0.117) (0.161) (0.119) (0.157) (0.117) (0.161) (0.119) (0.154) (0.116) (0.159) (0.118)
Age_19 0.007 -0.104 0.023 -0.088 0.004 -0.106 0.021 -0.089 0.010 -0.103 0.026 -0.087
(0.152) (0.118) (0.156) (0.120) (0.152) (0.118) (0.156) (0.121) (0.149) (0.117) (0.154) (0.120)
Age_20 -0.047 -0.164 -0.037 -0.153 -0.049 -0.167 -0.039 -0.155 -0.043 -0.161 -0.034 -0.150
(0.150) (0.116) (0.154) (0.119) (0.150) (0.116) (0.154) (0.119) (0.147) (0.115) (0.151) (0.118)
Age_21 -0.097 -0.126 -0.097 -0.114 -0.098 -0.129 -0.098 -0.116 -0.090 -0.125 -0.091 -0.113
(0.154) (0.113) (0.157) (0.116) (0.154) (0.114) (0.157) (0.117) (0.151) (0.113) (0.155) (0.116)
Age_22 -0.092 -0.119 -0.079 -0.103 -0.093 -0.121 -0.080 -0.105 -0.086 -0.117 -0.074 -0.102
(0.150) (0.123) (0.154) (0.126) (0.150) (0.123) (0.154) (0.126) (0.147) (0.122) (0.151) (0.125)
Age_23 -0.114 -0.129 -0.116 -0.119 -0.115 -0.133 -0.116 -0.122 -0.110 -0.129 -0.112 -0.119
(0.155) (0.113) (0.158) (0.116) (0.155) (0.113) (0.158) (0.116) (0.152) (0.113) (0.156) (0.116)
Age_24 -0.036 -0.124 -0.033 -0.121 -0.038 -0.125 -0.036 -0.122 -0.032 -0.122 -0.031 -0.120
(0.153) (0.115) (0.155) (0.118) (0.153) (0.115) (0.155) (0.119) (0.151) (0.114) (0.153) (0.118)
Age_25 -0.122 -0.117 -0.142 -0.104 -0.124 -0.118 -0.145 -0.105 -0.117 -0.117 -0.138 -0.105
(0.166) (0.121) (0.170) (0.124) (0.166) (0.122) (0.170) (0.125) (0.163) (0.120) (0.167) (0.124)
Age_26 -0.151 -0.148 -0.143 -0.116 -0.153 -0.148 -0.146 -0.115 -0.148 -0.149 -0.141 -0.117
(0.160) (0.115) (0.164) (0.117) (0.161) (0.115) (0.165) (0.118) (0.158) (0.115) (0.163) (0.118)
Household size 0.003 -0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.005 -0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Children under 5 years old -0.013 -0.057*** -0.014 -0.062*** -0.015 -0.058*** -0.015 -0.063*** -0.014 -0.057*** -0.014 -0.061***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022)
 Less_than_Matric -0.135 0.034 -0.166* 0.030 -0.135 0.036 -0.166* 0.031 -0.135 0.034 -0.165* 0.029
(0.087) (0.099) (0.089) (0.098) (0.087) (0.100) (0.089) (0.099) (0.087) (0.098) (0.089) (0.098)
 Matric -0.065 0.056 -0.089 0.050 -0.064 0.058 -0.088 0.052 -0.065 0.055 -0.088 0.049
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079)
More_than_Matric 0.008 0.086 -0.012 0.087 0.009 0.086 -0.012 0.087 0.009 0.086 -0.011 0.087
(0.072) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.072) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.072) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076)
Household head educated 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Owning home -0.017 0.017 -0.017 0.016 -0.017 0.018 -0.017 0.017 -0.020 0.016 -0.020 0.015
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
Life insurance -0.029 -0.015 -0.024 -0.018 -0.028 -0.016 -0.023 -0.018 -0.029 -0.015 -0.024 -0.017
(0.032) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030)
Washing machine 0.058* 0.035 0.053* 0.035 0.056* 0.037 0.052* 0.037 0.053* 0.032 0.049 0.032
(0.029) (0.038) (0.030) (0.038) (0.030) (0.038) (0.030) (0.038) (0.029) (0.038) (0.030) (0.037)
Constant 0.901*** 0.688** 0.866** 0.672* 0.847*** 0.714** 0.828** 0.695** 0.809*** 0.669** 0.786** 0.649*
(0.319) (0.332) (0.331) (0.341) (0.319) (0.326) (0.328) (0.335) (0.303) (0.326) (0.315) (0.337)
Observations 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236 1,558 1,236
R-squared 0.052 0.044 0.056 0.044 0.051 0.046 0.055 0.046 0.051 0.044 0.055 0.044
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas. Young adults condom use (females or males) equal 1 if young adults reported using condom at last sex, and  
0 otherwise.  OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household  member 
is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member,  Maxage^2
is  age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline covariates: young adults age dummies, 
young adults educational attainment  (Less_than_Matric, Matric, and More_than_Matric), (household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, and
Marital status of household member), and household assets  (Household ownership of home, Life insurance, and Washing machine).   Parameter estimates are statistically different from zero at *** 1%,






Table 7a:  Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Marital Status of Young Adults Aged 14-26
Dependent Variable: Young Adults Married
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP 0.038 -0.190*** 0.050 -0.175**
(0.061) (0.072) (0.059) (0.071)
OAPFemale -0.087 -0.282*** -0.070 -0.269***
(0.053) (0.061) (0.053) (0.061)
OAPMale 0.233*** 0.253*** 0.227*** 0.243***
(0.077) (0.070) (0.077) (0.070)
Maxage 0.056** 0.043** 0.056*** 0.043** 0.050** 0.044** 0.051** 0.044** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.056***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
Maxage^2 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 -0.002 -0.010 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 -0.009 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.014 -0.005 -0.011
(0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025)
Wave_4 -0.198*** -0.272*** -0.182*** -0.258*** -0.197*** -0.273*** -0.181*** -0.260*** -0.196*** -0.269*** -0.181*** -0.257***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
Constant -0.592* -0.473* -0.598** -0.485* -0.503 -0.479* -0.521* -0.492* -0.661** -0.742*** -0.649** -0.697***
(0.304) (0.282) (0.290) (0.270) (0.308) (0.280) (0.294) (0.268) (0.305) (0.274) (0.291) (0.263)
Observations 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668
R-squared 0.051 0.108 0.046 0.106 0.052 0.116 0.047 0.113 0.059 0.110 0.053 0.108
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Young adults marital status (females or males) equal 1 if young adults are married, and 0 otherwise.    
OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receive OAP, and 0 otherwise. OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if onle female household member is receiving  
OAP,  and 0 otherwise. OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise. Maxage is age of oldest member, Maxage^2 is age-squared  of
oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Parameter estimates are statistically different from zero






Table 7b:  Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Marital Status of Young Adults Aged 14-26 Controlling for Baseline Covariates
Dependent Variable: Young Adults Married
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP 0.019 -0.168** 0.023 -0.153**
(0.055) (0.068) (0.054) (0.067)
OAPFemale -0.102* -0.240*** -0.092* -0.229***
(0.054) (0.065) (0.053) (0.064)
OAPMale 0.207** 0.240*** 0.195** 0.236***
(0.082) (0.061) (0.083) (0.062)
Maxage 0.044** 0.053*** 0.041** 0.051*** 0.038* 0.054*** 0.037* 0.051*** 0.049** 0.069*** 0.045** 0.063***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018)
Maxage^2 -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 0.045 0.051* 0.042 0.055* 0.047 0.052* 0.044 0.055* 0.042 0.048 0.039 0.050*
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030)
Wave_4 -0.140*** -0.203*** -0.133*** -0.193*** -0.139*** -0.205*** -0.132*** -0.195*** -0.139*** -0.201*** -0.132*** -0.192***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.033)
Age_15 -0.070 0.107 -0.071 0.103 -0.069 0.106 -0.070 0.102 -0.069 0.121* -0.070 0.116*
(0.069) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.067) (0.071) (0.069)
Age_16 -0.001 -0.024 -0.004 -0.036 -0.003 -0.024 -0.006 -0.037 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.014
(0.066) (0.079) (0.066) (0.081) (0.066) (0.078) (0.066) (0.079) (0.066) (0.080) (0.066) (0.081)
Age_17 -0.072 -0.010 -0.075 -0.020 -0.078 -0.016 -0.079 -0.024 -0.073 -0.007 -0.075 -0.017
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
Age_18 -0.164*** -0.000 -0.167*** -0.016 -0.165*** -0.003 -0.169*** -0.019 -0.165*** 0.009 -0.169*** -0.008
(0.056) (0.063) (0.057) (0.063) (0.056) (0.062) (0.056) (0.062) (0.057) (0.063) (0.057) (0.063)
Age_19 -0.151*** -0.060 -0.159*** -0.076 -0.152*** -0.064 -0.159*** -0.079 -0.151*** -0.041 -0.158*** -0.060
(0.056) (0.067) (0.057) (0.068) (0.056) (0.066) (0.057) (0.067) (0.057) (0.065) (0.058) (0.067)
Age_20 -0.095 0.012 -0.104 -0.002 -0.099 0.002 -0.108* -0.010 -0.095 0.016 -0.104 -0.001
(0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Age_21 -0.149** -0.089 -0.151** -0.107 -0.156** -0.094 -0.157** -0.111 -0.150** -0.078 -0.152** -0.098
(0.071) (0.069) (0.071) (0.068) (0.069) (0.067) (0.071) (0.067) (0.071) (0.067) (0.072) (0.067)
Age_22 -0.126* -0.075 -0.128* -0.089 -0.132* -0.078 -0.133* -0.091 -0.127* -0.059 -0.128* -0.075
(0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.068) (0.065) (0.068) (0.065)
Age_23 -0.198** 0.016 -0.198** 0.005 -0.201*** 0.008 -0.201** -0.001 -0.192** 0.042 -0.192** 0.028
(0.076) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075) (0.076) (0.074) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.073) (0.078) (0.074)
Age_24 -0.115 -0.100 -0.101 -0.122 -0.117 -0.102 -0.102 -0.124 -0.118 -0.087 -0.103 -0.109
(0.079) (0.075) (0.082) (0.075) (0.080) (0.075) (0.082) (0.075) (0.080) (0.076) (0.082) (0.076)
Age_25 -0.208** -0.045 -0.199** -0.057 -0.214** -0.048 -0.204** -0.059 -0.213** -0.050 -0.202** -0.060
(0.088) (0.077) (0.091) (0.077) (0.088) (0.075) (0.091) (0.076) (0.090) (0.077) (0.092) (0.077)
Age_26 -0.009 0.035 -0.004 0.017 -0.009 0.035 -0.003 0.017 -0.011 0.054 -0.009 0.033
(0.091) (0.086) (0.094) (0.086) (0.090) (0.084) (0.093) (0.085) (0.093) (0.084) (0.095) (0.084)
Household size 0.013* 0.009 0.013* 0.011 0.013** 0.011 0.013** 0.012 0.014** 0.010 0.014** 0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Children under 5 years old 0.024 0.033 0.027 0.036 0.026 0.032 0.029 0.035 0.021 0.032 0.025 0.036
(0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.024)
Household head educated -0.058*** -0.052*** -0.058*** -0.050*** -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.058*** -0.052*** -0.058*** -0.050***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Owning home -0.047 -0.053 -0.043 -0.047 -0.045 -0.050 -0.041 -0.045 -0.043 -0.046 -0.039 -0.042
(0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
Life insurance 0.021 0.066* 0.023 0.062* 0.022 0.065* 0.023 0.061* 0.023 0.068* 0.025 0.064*
(0.029) (0.035) (0.030) (0.035) (0.029) (0.035) (0.030) (0.035) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.035)
Washing machine 0.084* 0.066 0.085* 0.072 0.086* 0.066 0.088* 0.072 0.084* 0.067 0.085* 0.072
(0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046)
Constant 0.286 -0.083 0.321 -0.076 0.369 -0.096 0.391 -0.086 0.203 -0.343 0.254 -0.282
(0.285) (0.273) (0.275) (0.264) (0.288) (0.270) (0.277) (0.262) (0.289) (0.256) (0.278) (0.250)
Observations 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668
R-squared 0.180 0.216 0.176 0.212 0.182 0.221 0.178 0.218 0.187 0.219 0.182 0.216
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Young adults marital status (females or males) equal 1 if young adults are married, and 0 otherwise.   
OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household member is receiving
OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member, Maxage^2 is  
age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline covariates: young adults age
dummies, (household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, and Marital status of household member), and household assets (Household ownership 




Table 7c:  Impact of Old Age Pension Program on Marital Status of Young Adults Aged 14-26 Controlling for Educational Attainment
Dependent Variable: Young Adults Married
Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction Without Attrition Correction With Attrition Correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
OAP 0.019 -0.164** 0.023 -0.150**
(0.056) (0.068) (0.055) (0.067)
OAPFemale -0.100* -0.236*** -0.090* -0.225***
(0.054) (0.065) (0.053) (0.063)
OAPMale 0.206** 0.240*** 0.195** 0.235***
(0.082) (0.060) (0.084) (0.061)
Maxage 0.044** 0.056*** 0.042** 0.053*** 0.039* 0.056*** 0.037* 0.054*** 0.049** 0.072*** 0.046** 0.065***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Maxage^2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maxage^3 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave_3 -0.016 -0.024 -0.017 -0.015 -0.015 -0.022 -0.016 -0.013 -0.018 -0.027 -0.020 -0.018
(0.044) (0.050) (0.044) (0.050) (0.044) (0.050) (0.043) (0.050) (0.045) (0.049) (0.045) (0.049)
Wave_4 -0.133*** -0.212*** -0.125*** -0.202*** -0.132*** -0.214*** -0.124*** -0.204*** -0.132*** -0.212*** -0.124*** -0.202***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.034)
Age_15 -0.070 0.108 -0.071 0.104 -0.069 0.106 -0.070 0.102 -0.069 0.121* -0.070 0.116*
(0.069) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.070) (0.068) (0.070) (0.067) (0.071) (0.069)
Age_16 -0.002 -0.027 -0.004 -0.039 -0.004 -0.027 -0.006 -0.039 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.017
(0.066) (0.080) (0.066) (0.081) (0.066) (0.078) (0.066) (0.080) (0.066) (0.081) (0.066) (0.082)
Age_17 -0.077 -0.017 -0.079 -0.026 -0.082 -0.022 -0.084 -0.030 -0.077 -0.014 -0.079 -0.023
(0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
Age_18 -0.168*** -0.005 -0.171*** -0.020 -0.169*** -0.008 -0.172*** -0.023 -0.169*** 0.004 -0.173*** -0.012
(0.056) (0.063) (0.057) (0.063) (0.056) (0.061) (0.056) (0.062) (0.058) (0.062) (0.057) (0.062)
Age_19 -0.154*** -0.067 -0.161*** -0.082 -0.154*** -0.070 -0.161*** -0.085 -0.154*** -0.049 -0.161*** -0.066
(0.057) (0.067) (0.057) (0.068) (0.056) (0.066) (0.057) (0.067) (0.058) (0.066) (0.058) (0.067)
Age_20 -0.101 0.007 -0.109* -0.007 -0.105 -0.003 -0.113* -0.015 -0.101 0.010 -0.109* -0.006
(0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
Age_21 -0.154** -0.100 -0.155** -0.119* -0.161** -0.105 -0.161** -0.122* -0.155** -0.091 -0.156** -0.111
(0.072) (0.068) (0.072) (0.068) (0.071) (0.067) (0.071) (0.067) (0.072) (0.068) (0.072) (0.067)
Age_22 -0.131* -0.093 -0.132* -0.106 -0.137** -0.095 -0.138** -0.108 -0.132* -0.078 -0.133* -0.092
(0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) (0.068) (0.065) (0.068) (0.065) (0.069) (0.065) (0.069) (0.065)
Age_23 -0.198** 0.004 -0.196** -0.007 -0.201** -0.004 -0.200** -0.013 -0.192** 0.027 -0.190** 0.015
(0.078) (0.075) (0.078) (0.075) (0.078) (0.074) (0.079) (0.075) (0.079) (0.073) (0.080) (0.074)
Age_24 -0.113 -0.114 -0.099 -0.136* -0.115 -0.116 -0.100 -0.137* -0.117 -0.102 -0.101 -0.123
(0.080) (0.075) (0.083) (0.075) (0.081) (0.074) (0.083) (0.074) (0.081) (0.076) (0.083) (0.076)
Age_25 -0.207** -0.053 -0.197** -0.066 -0.213** -0.057 -0.203** -0.069 -0.212** -0.061 -0.201** -0.072
(0.088) (0.076) (0.091) (0.077) (0.088) (0.074) (0.091) (0.075) (0.089) (0.076) (0.092) (0.076)
Age_26 0.004 0.026 0.010 0.007 0.003 0.025 0.010 0.007 0.001 0.043 0.006 0.021
(0.094) (0.085) (0.097) (0.086) (0.093) (0.084) (0.096) (0.085) (0.097) (0.084) (0.098) (0.084)
Household size 0.012* 0.009 0.013* 0.011 0.013* 0.010 0.013* 0.012 0.013** 0.010 0.014** 0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Children under 5 years old 0.027 0.033 0.030 0.037 0.028 0.032 0.032* 0.036 0.024 0.032 0.027 0.036
(0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.024)
Less_than_Matric -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.059*** -0.052*** -0.059*** -0.053*** -0.059*** -0.051*** -0.059*** -0.054*** -0.059*** -0.052***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Matric -0.235*** -0.118 -0.240*** -0.109 -0.231*** -0.108 -0.237*** -0.101 -0.236*** -0.101 -0.241*** -0.094
(0.082) (0.093) (0.083) (0.092) (0.081) (0.092) (0.081) (0.091) (0.084) (0.093) (0.084) (0.091)
More_than_Matric -0.222*** -0.053 -0.231*** -0.046 -0.218*** -0.044 -0.227*** -0.039 -0.222*** -0.033 -0.231*** -0.028
(0.075) (0.085) (0.075) (0.083) (0.074) (0.084) (0.075) (0.082) (0.077) (0.084) (0.077) (0.082)
Household head educated -0.144** -0.003 -0.152** -0.003 -0.141** 0.003 -0.148** 0.003 -0.147** 0.012 -0.154** 0.009
(0.067) (0.064) (0.066) (0.062) (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.063) (0.067) (0.064) (0.067) (0.063)
Owning home -0.047 -0.047 -0.043 -0.041 -0.045 -0.044 -0.041 -0.039 -0.043 -0.039 -0.039 -0.036
(0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036)
Life insurance 0.017 0.062* 0.019 0.058* 0.017 0.061* 0.019 0.058* 0.019 0.064* 0.021 0.061*
(0.029) (0.035) (0.030) (0.034) (0.029) (0.035) (0.030) (0.034) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.035)
Washing machine 0.086* 0.063 0.087* 0.069 0.088* 0.063 0.089** 0.069 0.086* 0.064 0.087* 0.069
(0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.047)
Constant 0.530* 0.009 0.569** 0.008 0.608** -0.013 0.635** -0.008 0.448 -0.264 0.504* -0.209
(0.293) (0.297) (0.282) (0.289) (0.296) (0.292) (0.285) (0.285) (0.297) (0.283) (0.287) (0.276)
Observations 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668 2,068 1,668
R-squared 0.184 0.219 0.180 0.216 0.186 0.225 0.181 0.221 0.190 0.223 0.185 0.219
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses adjust for clustered at the enumeration areas.  Young adults marital status (females or males) equal 1 if young adults are married, and 0 otherwise.   
OAP is a dummy variable equal 1 if any household member (female or male) receives OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPFemale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only female household  member is receiving
OAP, and 0 otherwise.  OAPMale is a dummy variable equal 1 if only male household member is receiving OAP, and 0 otherwise.  Maxage is age of oldest household member,  Maxage^2 is
age-squared of oldest household member, and Maxage^3 is age-cubed of oldest household member.  Wave 1=2002, Wave 3=2005, and Wave 4=2006.  Baseline covariates: young adults age dummies, 
young adults educational attainment  (Less_than_Matric, Matric, and More_than_Matric), (household characteristics (Household size, Children under 5 years old, Household head educated, and
Marital status of household member), and household assets  (Household ownership of home, Life insurance, and Washing machine).   Parameter estimates are statistically different from zero at
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